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THE END OF “MODES OF LIABILITY” FOR 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
 





 Modes of liability, such as ordering, instigation, superior 
responsibility and joint criminal liability, are arguably the most discussed 
topics in modern international criminal justice. In recent years, a wide 
range of scholars have rebuked some of these modes of liability for 
compromising basic concepts in liberal notions of blame attribution, 
thereby reducing international defendants to mere instruments for the 
promotion of wider socio-political objectives. Critics attribute this 
willingness to depart from orthodox concepts of criminal responsibility to 
international forces, be they interpretative styles typical of human rights 
or aspirations associated with transitional justice. Strangely, however, 
complicity has avoided these criticisms entirely, even though it too fails 
the tests international criminal lawyers use as benchmarks in the 
deconstruction of other modes. Moreover, the source of complicity’s 
departures from basic principles is not international as previously 
suggested—it stems from international criminal law’s emulation of 
objectionable domestic criminal doctrine. If, instead of inheriting the dark 
sides of domestic criminal law, we apply international scholars’ criticisms 
across all modes of liability, complicity (and all other modes of liability) 
disintegrates into a broader notion of perpetration. A unitary theory could 
also attach to all prosecutions for international crimes, both international 
and domestic, transcending the long-endured fixation on modes of liability 
within the discipline. 
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 “I have the most profound conviction that I am being made to pay 
here for the glass that others have broken.” 
 




 International criminal courts and tribunals use the term “modes of 
liability” to designate participants in a crime. Even though the label is 
conceptually misleading and of uncertain historical pedigree,2 it has 
emerged as the preferred description of a whole series of doctrine, ranging 
from traditional notions of instigation to the more exotic concepts of 
superior responsibility and joint criminal enterprise. Understandably, the 
concepts attract tremendous judicial and scholarly treatment. After all, the 
contours of “modes of liability” determine whether Eichmann’s 
                                                
1 Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocities, 105 
GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1764 (2005) (quoting from GERMAN 
CRIMINAL LAW ENRIQUE GIMBERNAT ORDEIG, AUTOR Y COMPLICE EN DERECHO PENAL 
[PERPETRATOR AND ACCOMPLICE IN CRIMINAL LAW] COLUM. L. REV. trans., 1996)). 
2 Importantly, the phrase “modes of liability” is conceptually misleading and of uncertain 
historical pedigree. It is legally misleading because these doctrines only attribute 
unlawfulness rather than “liability”. The better term is “modes of attribution,” since 
whether a defendant is “liable” once a particular unlawful act is attributed to her requires 
a further assessment of justifications and excuses. Admittedly, this nomenclature is 
premised on a preference for the normative theory of guilt GEORGE FLETCHER, THE 
GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW : AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL 319, 329 
(2007). In terms of origin, it is also unclear where international criminal justice acquired 
the term “modes of liability,” and why it gained such ascendency in the discipline. Early 
international judgments used the more appropriate phrase “modes of participation”: 
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 227 (May 7, 1997) (referring to 
joint criminal enterprise as a “mode of participation”); Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. IT-
04-83-T, Judgment, ¶ 56 (Sep. 15, 2008) (referring to superior responsibility as a “mode 
of participation”); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 266 (Mar. 3, 
2000) (discussing ordering, planning, instigating or otherwise aiding and abetting as 
“modes of participation”). This accords with the descriptor adopted in most domestic 
criminal systems.  In German criminal law, the overarching concept is 'Beteiligung', 
which experts translate as 'Participation'. See MICHAEL BOHLANDER, PRINCIPLES OF 
GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW 154 (2008); French criminal theory also refers to criminal 
participation, see Christine Lazerges, La participation criminelle, in RÉFLEXIONS SUR LE 
NOUVEAU CODE PÉNAL, 11 (1995); for historical antecedents, see also B. GETZ, DE LA 
SOI-DISANT PARTICIPATION AU CRIME (1876); in many Anglo-American jurisdictions, the 
tendency is to describe modes of liability as those rules that determine parties to crime. 
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, 5TH 701 (5th ed. 2010) (employing the term 
“Parties to Crime”); A. SIMESTER & G.R. SULLIVAN, CRIMINAL LAW : THEORY AND 
DOCTRINE 195-246 (3rd ed. 2007) (discussing modes of participation). 
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punishment for the glass others broke is an illiberal instance of vicarious 
liability or justifiable blame for his contribution to atrocity. In what 
follows, I argue that complicity falls on the wrong side of these 
alternatives, and that consequently, it should collapse along with all other 
modes of liability into a single broad notion of perpetration. This, as we 
will soon see, promises to transcend a long-endured fixation on modes of 
liability within the discipline. 
 Since its modern revival, international criminal justice has devoted 
tremendous energy to the topic of modes of liability, precisely because 
international courts are committed to convicting Eichmann (and all the 
modern masterminds of atrocity like him) for the violence others have 
perpetrated.3 To this end, international criminal courts have crafted a 
series of “modes of liability” that treat principal architects of atrocity as 
perpetrators (even though masterminds seldom pull the trigger, deploy the 
asphyxiants, throw the electrical switch or, to borrow from Eichmann, 
break the glass). These new “modes of liability” (such as superior 
responsibility, joint criminal enterprise, indirect perpetration and 
perpetration through an organization) are necessary, we are told, to 
accurately capture the role of the principal architects of atrocity.  
                                                
3  A large number of international criminal courts expressly profess a commitment to 
only prosecuting those ‘who bear the greatest responsibility’ for crimes within their 
jurisdiction. See: Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra 
Leone on Establishing a Special Court for Sierra Leone (with Statute), art. 1.1, Sierra 
Leone-U.N., Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137 (“The Special Court shall, except as 
provided in subparagraph (2), have the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean 
law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those 
leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and 
implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”); ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 
Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, Sept. 2003, at 7 (“The 
global character of the ICC, its statutory provisions and logistical constraints support a 
preliminary recommendation that, as a general rule, the Office of the Prosecutor should 
focus its investigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those who bear the 
greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organisation allegedly 
responsible for those crimes.”); Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
Internal Rules (Rev. 4) as revised on 11 September 2009, Preamble (“WHEREAS the 
Cambodian authorities have requested assistance from the United Nations in bringing to 
trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for 
the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian 
law and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were 
committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979”); For scholarly 
opinion endorsing this view, see Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and 
Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 510 (2003); For a more critical assessment, see Jose E Alvarez, Crimes of 
States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365 (1999). 
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 One especially evocative image drives the process. For many, the 
dilemma is that the application of everyday rules of criminal attribution 
lead to Hitler’s conviction as an accomplice for the Holocaust. The 
proposition is simply insupportable since it would “get the moral valences 
entirely wrong—almost backwards, in fact.”4 To a large extent, this 
perception explains the motivation for adopting novel standards of blame 
attribution at the international level. But from the competing perspective, 
Eichmann’s last words before the gallows leave a lingering concern modes 
of liability that make someone responsible for the acts of others might be 
fundamentally unfair. Thus, the development of modes of liability in 
international criminal justice reflects a persistent tension between these 
two competing extremes: functional attempts at ensuring accountability of 
senior masterminds of mass violence versus the very real threat of illiberal 
excess. 
 Initially, international courts looked domestically for solutions to their 
moral quandary, borrowing the most permissive “modes of liability” from 
domestic criminal systems. Yet in the ensuing years, these “modes of 
liability” have generated a flood of criticism. Many scholars have rebuked 
international doctrines such as superior responsibility and joint criminal 
enterprise as “display[ing] a measure of insensitivity to an actor’s own 
personal culpability.”5 The criticism has become so extensive that it may 
be fair to say that a majority of scholars view the modes of liability 
deployed to solve the Hitler-as-accomplice dilemma as closer to 
substantiating Eichmann’s appeal to unfairness than they are to offering a 
defensible account of criminal responsibility. This has led to a growing 
perception that international criminal courts of various descriptions “risk 
                                                
4 MARK OSIEL, MAKING SENSE OF MASS ATROCITY 85 (2009). The only caveat is that 
Osiel’s comment assumes an objective theory of perpetration, whereby the perpetrator is 
the person who actually releases the gas into the concentration camps. As we will later 
see, the objective theory is theoretically discredited, but this does not undermine Osiel’s 
point that rank and file perpetrators are generally viewed as less culpable than their 
superiors in international criminal justice. 
5 Mirjan Damas̆ka, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 
LAW 455, 456 (2001).  Aside from Damas̆ka’s excellent article, the critical literature is 
extensive. For some of the best exemplars, see in particular Héctor Olásolo, Reflections 
on the International Criminal Court’s Jurisdictional Reach, 16 CRIM. L. FORUM 279 
(2005); Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International 
Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75 (2005); Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of 
International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 925 (2008); Jens David Ohlin, Three 
Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 69 (2007). 
2011] THE END OF “MODES OF LIABILITY” 6 
   
using the accused as an object in a didactic exercise rather than respecting 
autonomy and fairness.”6 
 Strangely, however, complicity has escaped careful theoretical 
scrutiny in the scholarly revolt against international modes of liability.7 
This is peculiar since complicity, or accessorial liability as it is otherwise 
known, is of central relevance to the Hitler-as-accessory dilemma; is 
increasingly prominent in international discourse; and most importantly, 
also harbors a glaring conceptual anomaly—the doctrine holds the 
accomplice liable for the same crime as the perpetrator, even though the 
accomplice by definition did not personally carry out the offense.8 To 
illustrate, someone convicted of aiding genocide by supplying the 
weapons is herself guilty of genocide, even though she never killed a soul. 
As John Gardner aptly puts it, “[a]s far as the conviction goes, it is as if 
she had pulled the trigger herself.”9 Consequently, this fiction should raise 
the alarm that complicity too entails “a dramatic escalation of 
responsibility.”10  
                                                
6 Robinson, supra note 5, at 931. 
7 There is a considerable and important literature dealing with the doctrine and policy of 
complicity in international criminal justice, but to my knowledge, none of it explores the 
objectionable peripheries of the doctrine. See, for example, Andrew Clapham & Scott 
Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 339 (2000) (explaining three categories of policy implication derived 
from the application of complicity); LEIV LUNDE, MARK TAYLOR & ANNE HUSER, 
COMMERCE OR CRIME? REGULATING ECONOMIES OF CONFLICT (2003) (providing a 
helpful synthesis of the law of complicity in sixteen different jurisdictions); Chimène I. 
Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61 (2008) 
(discussing ATCA cases that employ complicity); for a notable exception, see Markus D. 
Dubber, Criminalizing Complicity: A Comparative Analysis, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 977 
(2007) (discussing the need for international criminal justice to craft a law of complicity 
specific for its purposes). 
8 The French Criminal Law is a good example of this paradox. Article 121-6 of the 
French Criminal Codes stipulates that “[s]era puni comme auteur le complice de 
l’infraction”. Simultaneously, leading experts define complicity as “un mode 
d’imputation dirigé contre une personne qui a aidé à la realization d’une situation 
infractionnelle sans pour autant accomplir elle-même aucun des actes visé par le texte 
d’incrimination.” JACQUES-HENRI ROBERT, DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRAL 343 (6e éd. refondue. 
ed. 2005). 
9 John Gardner, “Aid, Abet, Counsel, Procure”: an English View of Complicity, in 
EINZELVERANTWORTUNG UND MITVERANTWORTUNG IM STRAFRECHT, 228 (Albin Eser, 
Barbara Huber, & Karin Cornils eds., 1998). Lord Steyn, of the then British House of 
Lords, also put the point succinctly in the Pinochet litigation when he cited “an 
elementary principle of law, shared by all civilised legal systems, that there is no 
distinction between the man who strikes, and a man who orders another to strike.” Lord 
Steyn in R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 
(1998) 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L) at 54. 
10 Damas̆ka, supra note 5, at 464. 
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 As I will show, complicity too fails the tests scholars use as 
benchmarks in the deconstruction of other modes of liability. And yet 
these departures from defensible theory defy hypotheses authors have 
offered to explain the origins of harsh international doctrine. To date, 
critics have argued that these sorts of conceptual overreach are a 
byproduct of an uncomfortable amalgamation of the interpretative cultures 
that animate international criminal justice, namely interpretative styles 
typical of human rights and law of war; the effect of moral outrage on 
interpretative technique; or the broader political aspirations associated 
with transitional justice that are said to drive hermeneutics in international 
criminal adjudication.11 An analysis of complicity, however, reveals that 
this explanation under-appreciates the role of domestic criminal justice in 
the development of objectionable international doctrine. In reality, 
complicity’s most objectionable characteristics are inherited from 
domestic exemplars that national scholars denounce as a conceptual 
“disgrace.”12 
 Let me qualify this criticism from the outset. I do not claim that 
domestic criminal law is of no value to international jurisdictions. 
International courts will inevitably take inspiration from domestic 
standards as practitioners with uniquely criminal law backgrounds (who 
are, I suspect, a majority in international criminal justice) draw on 
domestic concepts in the day-to-day operation of modern international 
criminal courts. This process is entirely unavoidable and by and large 
positive—how else could practitioners come to terms with the novelty of 
supranational criminal law except through their pre-established experience 
of criminal justice? And international criminal justice certainly has much 
to learn from this experience. And yet, much of the excellent criticism of 
                                                
11 Danner and Martinez, supra note 5, at 78 (“International human rights law, domestic 
criminal law, and transitional justice. Each one, to varying degrees, informs the purposes 
and principles of international prosecution, and their interaction creates conflicts within 
international criminal law itself.”); Robinson, supra note 5, at 961 (“Interpretive, 
substantive, structural, and ideological assumptions of human rights and humanitarian 
law have been absorbed into ICL discourse, distorting methods of reasoning and 
undermining compliance with fundamental principles.”) In fairness to Darryl Robinson, 
his excellent piece also mentions that this may only be part of the problem and that 
domestic systems depart from basic principles too. Robinson, supra note 5, at 927-930; 
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, The Pluralism of International Criminal Law, 86 IND. L. J. 
1111 (2011) (observing doubts about tribunals commitments to core principles of justice 
“that many domestic legal systems take for granted”, and arguing that “[w]hile greater 
reliance on domestic law might not offer a complete solution, it may offer at least one 
positive step in ICL’s rediscovery of a criminal law that better aspires to ICL’s liberal 
aims.”) 
12 Joshua Dressler, Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser Offense? 5 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 427, 427 (2008). 
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modes of liability has eagerly pointed out the dark sides of international 
doctrine as if domestic systems do not have equivalents, which has 
produced a skewed vision of the origins of objectionable international 
doctrine. As one prominent expert of domestic criminal law laments, 
departures from principle are so consistent in some national systems that 
criminal theory may well be “a lost cause.”13  
 The shortcomings of complicity, however, lead to a wider set of 
reflections about modes of liability as a species. If accessorial liability 
fails the standards that scholars of international criminal justice erect to 
judge other international modes of liability, will there be any mode that 
survives the analytical deconstruction? Put differently, could it not be 
possible to put an end to the highly complicated, seriously inefficient and 
frequently harsh development of modes of liability in international 
criminal justice by adopting a unitary theory of perpetration that collapses 
all modes of liability into a single standard? On this account of blame 
attribution, only a causal contribution and the mental element required for 
the offence would be necessary; all those who contribute to international 
crimes would be deemed perpetrators, dispensing with all other forms of 
legal classification. 
 The theory is not just conceptually coherent, it is also well suited to 
the realities of modern international criminal justice. On the theoretical 
plane, many scholars of criminal law are beginning to advocate for the 
abandonment of complicity,14 often because they perceive that a proper 
conception of perpetration renders complicity “superfluous.”15 These 
                                                
13 Andrew Ashworth, Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?, 116 L. Q. REV. 225 (2000). 
14 Michael S. Moore, The Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, in CAUSATION AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 280 (2009); Bob 
Sullivan, Principals and Accomplices-A Necessary and Useful Division?, in 
FOUNDATIONAL ISSUES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW, 651 (Anthony Duff & 
Christopher Wong eds., 2007); Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 369 (1996) (although Kadish does not advocate for the abolition of 
complicity, his position is closest to that I advance here); LARRY ALEXANDER & 
KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 7-
10 (1 ed. 2009) (arguing that insufficient concern is the baseline for all forms of criminal 
responsibility); DIETHELM KIENAPFEL, DER EINHEITSTÄTER IM STRAFRECHT (1971); 
THOMAS ROTSCH, “EINHEITSTÄTERSCHAFT” STATT TATHERRSCHAFT: ZUR ABKEHR VON 
EINEM DIFFERENZIERENDEN BETEILIGUNGSFORMENSYSTEM IN EINER NORMATIV-
FUNKTIONALEN STRAFTATLEHRE (2009). 
15 Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 395 (2007). The description of complicity as superfluous is overly 
forgiving of the violations of theoretical principles complicity presently entails, but in 
fairness to Michael Moore, his analysis does not consider the mental element of aiding 
and abetting where the most conspicuous violations of culpability occur. Moreover, his 
assessment of the physical element does not deal with standards adopted in international 
2011] THE END OF “MODES OF LIABILITY” 9 
   
scholarly arguments find practical support in at least five modern domestic 
criminal systems from Italy to Brazil, which operate unitary systems of 
perpetration that abandon the sorts of “modes of liability” that have 
plagued modern international criminal justice.16 Moreover, the unitary 
theory also has international precedence—the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals initially dispensed with a distinction between direct perpetration 
and accomplice liability entirely.17  
 Surprisingly then, the unitary theory of perpetration has gone largely 
unnoticed in international criminal justice, even as scholars advocate for 
its adoption within a less mature system of European criminal law.18 
Putting aside the theoretical merits of the concept, an obvious pragmatic 
appeal lies in its ability to transcend the numerous inconsistencies between 
systems of blame attribution in each of the European systems it 
amalgamates. On this basis, one would imagine that the unitary theory 
should be all the more attractive internationally given the exponentially 
larger number of national systems globally, each of which contains 
disparate “modes of liability.” Regrettably, the intensity of the debate 
                                                                                                                     
criminal justice, which deviate from basic principles elsewhere. Both these points are 
explored further below. 
16 The countries are Austria, Brazil, Denmark, Italy and Poland. For further information, 
see JEAN PRADEL, DROIT PÉNAL COMPARÉ 121, 133 (2e ed. 2002); Kai Ambos, 
Development of a Common Substantive Criminal Law for Europe Possible? Some 
Preliminary Reflections, 12 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. 173, 182-185 (2005) (setting 
out examples from various unitary jurisdictions). 
17 Although the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters adopted differentiated doctrines of 
complicity, the majority of cases merely considered whether an accused was “concerned 
in,” “connected with”, “inculpated in” or “implicated in” international crimes. For a 
overview of these cases, see The United Nations War Crimes Commission, Digest of the 
Laws and Cases, LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, VOL XV at 49-58. 
Like Hector Olásolo, I conclude that this amounts to a unitary theory of perpetration 
insofar as it fails to distinguish modes of participation. See OLÁSOLO ET AL., THE 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SENIOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS AS 
PRINCIPALS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 21 (2010). 
18 Johannes Keiler, Towards a European Concept of Participation in Crime, in 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (André Klip ed., 2011); 
BETTINA WEIßER, TÄTERSCHAFT IN EUROPA: EIN DISKUSSIONSVORSCHLAG FÜR EIN 
EUROPÄISCHES TÄTERMODELL AUF DER BASIS EINER RECHTSVERGLEICHENDEN 
UNTERSUCHUNG DER ... FRANKREICHS, ITALIENS UND ÖSTERREICHS (1. Auflage. ed. 
2011); WOLFGANG SCHÖBERL, DIE EINHEITSTÄTERSCHAFT ALS EUROPÄISCHES MODELL: 
DIE STRAFRECHTLICHE BETEILIGUNGSREGELUNG IN ÖSTERREICH UND DEN NORDISCHEN 
LÄNDERN (1 ed. 2006); Ambos, supra note 17, at 182-185;  for rare exceptions to the rule 
that scholars do not consider the unitary theory of perpetration for international crimes, 
see OLÁSOLO ET AL., supra note 19 at 14-20; E. VAN SLIEDREGT, THE CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 61–65 (1st Edition. ed. 2003). 
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around international modes of liability has obscured a potential solution 
hiding in plain sight.  
 This Article exposes the theory. To begin, Part I introduces criticisms 
of superior responsibility and joint criminal enterprise in order to flesh out 
the key theoretical objections raised against each of these modes of 
liability. Through this process, I isolate conceptual principles that are later 
helpful in revealing the objectionable peripheries of complicity. In Part II, 
I undertake this exercise by first exploring the identity of complicity in 
international criminal justice, then by assessing the mental and physical 
elements required for accessorial liability in light of the criticisms of other 
modes of liability in the field. I conclude that complicity too falls well 
short of the standards used to criticize other “modes of liability,” but that 
this arises from the influence of objectionable domestic standards, not the 
undeniable pressures of international law or politics.  
 Having concluded that any defensible concept of complicity requires 
complicity and perpetration to share several common elements, Part III 
defends the unitary theory in abstract theoretical terms then assesses 
pragmatic arguments for applying the standard to international crimes 
particularly. I argue that whatever moral significance there might be 
between making a difference to a crime and “making a difference to the 
difference that principals make”,19 this discrepancy can be adequately 
accounted for at the sentencing stage of a criminal trial. The 
deconstruction of complicity shows that, at the very least, we must bring it 
much closer to perpetration, but my argument is that the characteristics of 
international criminal justice militate in favor of allowing complicity to 
disintegrate entirely into a unified notion of perpetration in all domestic 
and international jurisdictions capable of prosecuting these offenses. What 
emerges then, is a preferable account of when we can hold Eichmann and 
his many analogues responsible for the glass others broke—without 
fallaciously escalating his guilt. 
 
II. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CRITICISM OF MODES OF LIABILITY 
 
 It is instructive to briefly review the considerable literature criticizing 
other modes of liability in international criminal justice in order to isolate 
basic tenets of criminal responsibility. I here use the most objectionable 
elements of two modes of liability that are often admonished within 
international circles in order to identify a framework through which we 
might later interrogate complicity.  
                                                
19 John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, 1 CRIM. L. AND PHIL. 127, 128 (2007). 
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A. A Blameworthy Moral Choice: The Mental Element in JCE III 
 Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) holds all those who agree to a common 
plan involving the perpetration of a crime responsible for other 
foreseeable offences that take place during the execution of the plan.20 I 
here use scholarly discussion of the so-called “third” or extended variant 
of JCE to introduce fundamental principles about blameworthy moral 
choice in international criminal discourse, since so many scholars have 
openly deplored JCE III’s tendency to “overpower the restraining force of 
the criminal law tradition.”21 While these criticisms appropriately expose 
basic principles applicable to mental elements in modes of liability, their 
idealized vision of the criminal tradition’s predominantly restraining 
character understates the sometimes major gaps between theory and 
practice in domestic systems and their effect on the development of 
unjustifiable international doctrine. 
 JCE has three strands. The first “basic” form occurs where “co-
defendants, acting pursuant to a common design, possess the same 
criminal purpose.”22 An example would be a plan formulated by three 
soldiers to torture a detainee, where each of the soldiers carries out a 
different role (holding the victim down, preventing others from entering 
the room and applying electrodes and controlling the current). This 
“basic” form of JCE holds each of the soldiers responsible for the war 
crime of torture, even though the men guarding the door and restraining 
the victim do not satisfy the elements of the crime—like Eichmann, they 
do not personally perform the crime. The second “systematic” form of 
joint criminal enterprise is a mere subset of the “basic” form, and 
therefore adds little of great salience for present purposes,23 mostly 
                                                
20 To find individual criminal responsibility pursuant to a joint criminal enterprise, the 
elements which must be established are: (i) a plurality of persons; (ii) the existence of a 
common plan, design or purpose which amounts to or involves the commission of a 
crime provided for in the Statute; and (iii) the participation of the accused in the common 
plan involving the perpetration of one of the crimes provided for in the Statute. For a 
particularly recent affirmation, see Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Judgment, Case No. IT-00-
39-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, ¶ 156–157 (Mar. 17, 2009). 
21 Danner and Martinez, supra note 5, at 132. 
22 Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 2, at 196.  Note that this language is not always 
consistent: see Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment, ¶ 97 (Feb. 25, 
2004) (finding that “[t]he first category is a ‘basic’ form of joint criminal enterprise. It is 
represented by cases where all co-perpetrators, acting pursuant to a common purposes, 
possess the same criminal intention.”). 
23 In JCE II, the common plan in JCE I is merely replaced by “an organized criminal 
system,” such as an extermination or concentration camp. There is, therefore, general 
consensus that this “systematic” category in JCE II is only a subset of the ‘basic’ form in 
JCE I. See for instance, Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 2, at 203 (“this category of 
cases... is really a variant of the first category”); Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. 
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because it also requires that the participants in the enterprise harbor the 
necessary intent to torture. 
 The third variant, however, descends into darker territory. Under JCE 
III, all participants in a joint criminal enterprise are responsible for crimes 
committed beyond those agreed, provided they are “a natural and 
foreseeable consequence of the common purpose.”24 Thus, the soldier 
manning the door is also convicted of torturing the victim, even if he 
believed he was guarding the entry to prevent enemy soldiers entering and 
only foresaw that one of his confederates might commit torture while they 
were in the premises.25 The great anomaly is not only that the lookout is 
punished for having perpetrated torture even though he did not personally 
hurt a fly; it is also that he is convicted based on mere foresight, a standard 
well below that defined in the offence for which he is punished. The key 
point is that JCE III tolerates a sharp cleavage between the definition of 
crimes and modes of liability used to convict defendants of them—the two 
categories overlap, but not perfectly. 
 From whence did the doctrine come? True, the famed Tadić Appeal 
Judgment declared JCE III part of customary international law, but this 
finding was a mere reiteration of national principles. To the extent that the 
court purported to draw on custom, it cited cases convened by British, 
Canadian, American Military Tribunals applying Control Council Law 
No. 10, as well as domestic courts within Italy, all of which originally 
applied national concepts of attribution.26 And in any event, the ICTY 
explicitly affirmed that, “international criminal rules on common purpose 
[i.e. JCE] are substantially rooted in, and to a large extent reflect, a 
position taken by many States of the world in their national legal 
                                                                                                                     
IT-98-30/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 82 (Feb. 28, 2005) (describing JCE II as “a variant of the first 
form”); Kai Ambos, Amicus Curiae Brief in the Matter of the Co-Prosecutors’ Appeal of 
the Closing Order Against Kaing Guek Eav “Duch” Dated 8 August 2008, 20 CRIM. L. 
FORUM 353, 374 (2009) (concluding that JCEII can be viewed as an element of JCE I if 
interpreted narrowly). 
24 Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., supra note 20, at 83. 
25 In fact, there is good authority for the idea that the standard is actually objective 
foreseeability, lowering the mental element required for JCEIII even further. See Antonio 
Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 109, 121 (2007) (arguing that most courts 
actually apply an objective standard of foreseeability for JCEIII). 
26 Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 2, at 204. For discussion, see Verena Haan, The 
Development of the Concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 167, 177 (2005). For other 
arguments that JCE is an outgrowth of the US concept of Pinkerton liability, see George 
P. Fletcher, New Court, Old Dogmatik, 9 J. OF INT'L CRIM. JUST. 187 (2011),.  
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systems.”27 Therefore, to the extent that international criminal courts and 
tribunals are applying controversial standards of attribution like JCEIII, it 
is largely because they have imitated national equivalents. 
 The critics, however, have shown JCE III no mercy, largely on the 
grounds that the incongruity between the mental element for the mode and 
that required for the crime leads to a violation of the principle of 
culpability.28 Traditionally the offshoot of retributivism, culpability 
reflects a commitment to the idea that an individual’s punishment must be 
calibrated to her personal desert.29 The immediate retort (that I heard many 
times from Anglo-American lawyers in practice) is that this focus on 
culpability is overly academic when national systems depart from the 
principle as a matter of course. If JCE III solves the Hitler-as-accomplice 
dilemma and furthers the noble aspirations of the international justice 
project,30 why should international courts moderate their use of the 
doctrine when so many major Western jurisdictions apply an identical 
concept?  
 In simple terms, guilt matters. An individual cannot be instrumentally 
punished to pursue even noble policy goals. Although this notion dates at 
least to Kant, in the English-speaking tradition, H.L.A Hart famously 
reconciled it with utilitarian theories of punishment by pointing out a 
disparity between the objectives of the criminal system as a whole and the 
                                                
27 Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 2, at 193. In support of this proposition, the Tribunal 
cited law from France, Italy, England and Wales, Canada, the United States, Australia 
and Zambia that also criminalize a version of JCE III, id. at 224. 
28 Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 159, 174 (2007) (concluding that relative to other aspects of JCE, “the conflict of 
JCE III with the principle of culpability is more fundamental”); George P. Fletcher & 
Jens David Ohlin, Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur 
Case, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 539, 548 (2005) (arguing that “the doctrine [JCE] itself is 
substantively overbroad and transgresses basic principles of legality that limit 
punishment to personal culpability.”); Ohlin, supra note 5, at 85 (discussing the violation 
of culpability occasioned by punishing different degrees of contribution equally); Danner 
and Martinez, supra note 5, at 134 (arguing that JCE poses significant challenges to the 
culpability principle). 
29 In a sense, desert is synonymous with meritocracy. If an individual performs well in an 
exam, she deserves an excellent mark. If she kills her mother, she deserves punishment. 
For more on the positive and negative notions of desert, see JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND 
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 55 (1974).  See also PAUL H. 
ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED, 
HOW MUCH? 135 (2008) (discussing vengeful, deontological and empirical concepts of 
desert). 
30 Mirjan Damas̆ka, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice? 83 CHI.-KENT. 
L. REV. 329 (2008); Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal 
Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 561 (2002). 
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principles to be employed in attributing blame in concrete cases.31 He 
illustrates the distinction with a striking example—even if your rationale 
for punishment within the system generally is deterrence, it is clearly 
morally vulgar to punish family members of those who carried out 
criminal offenses, even if doing so has massive deterrent effects.32 In a 
similar example of greater salience for international criminal justice, 
George Fletcher chillingly recalls that “[a]s the National Socialists well 
knew in controlling inmates in slave labour camps, occasionally hanging 
an innocent person effectively deters disobedience by other inmates.”33 
Quite clearly, punishment without culpability is anathema to liberal 
notions of criminal law, even if it does promote deterrence or other 
desirable outcomes. 
 Therefore, culpability is central to any theoretically justifiable account 
of criminal responsibility, from retributivism to restorative justice.34 True, 
advocates of restorative criminal justice may calculate guilt slightly 
differently,35 but they are still committed to the notion that “only the 
                                                
31 According to Hart, “[w]hat is needed is the realization that different principles (each of 
which may in a sense be called a ‘justification’ [for punishment]) are relevant at different 
points in any morally acceptable account of punishment.” Furthermore, “it is perfectly 
consistent to assert both that the General Justifying Aim of the practice of punishment is 
its beneficial consequences and that the pursuit of this General Aim should be qualified 
or restricted out of deference to principles of Distribution which require that punishment 
should be only of an offender for an offense.” See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 3, 9 (Rev. ed. 1984) (emphasis in 
original). 
32 Id. at 5-6. 
33 GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 415 (1978). 
34 For a helpful overview of the different intensities of retribution and their intersection 
with utilitarian justifications for criminal law, see Alexander and Ferzan, supra note 15, 
at 7-10 (discussing weak, moderate and strong conceptions of retributivism); for a 
summary of similar thinking in German criminal theory, see VOLKER KREY, 1 
DEUTSCHES STRAFRECHT : ALLGEMEINER TEIL 118 (2002) (discussing dominant theories 
of punishment in German criminal law, none of which advocate extending liability 
beyond an individual’s desert). 
35  Since restorative fault emphasizes a defendant’s responsibility for rectifying harm he 
has caused, John Braithwaite has argued that assessments of fault should be moved from 
their current point of assessment at the time the crime is perpetrated, “to fault based on 
how restoratively the offender acts after the crime.” John Braithwaite, Intention versus 
Reactive Fault, in INTENTION IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 345 (Ngaire Naffine, Rosemary J. 
Owens, & John Matthew Williams eds., 2001). Few courts have adopted restorative 
theories of punishment in cases involving international crimes, such that Braithwaite’s 
vision of culpability is less germane for present purposes. This leaves open the question 
whether, in preferencing some version of retributive punishment, international criminal 
lawyers may have “hitched themselves to a dead horse.” GERRY SIMPSON, LAW, WAR 
AND CRIME: WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND THE REINVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 
(2007). 
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guilty should be punished.”36 In fact, these philosophical commitments are 
so widely held that Mirjan Damas̆ka plausibly claims that “if one were to 
catalog general principles of law so widely recognized by the community 
of nations that they constitute a subsidiary source of public international 
law, the culpability principle would be one of the most serious candidates 
for inclusion in the list.”37 And yet, while this is true at the level of 
principle, it overlooks states’ sometimes prolific abdication from 
theoretical standards in practice and the genealogy of JCE in national law. 
 Unsurprisingly, international criminal courts mimic this schizophrenic 
relationship with culpability. When addressing the concept in abstract 
terms, they also adopt a formal rendition of the culpability principle, 
insisting that “the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of 
personal culpability: nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts 
or transactions in which he has not personally engaged or in some way 
participated”.38 The pledge is laudable but it also omits half the concept. 
An individual is culpable, not just because she participated in criminal acts 
or transactions, but also because she made a blameworthy moral choice to 
do so.39 So already the tremendous incidence of strict liability crimes 
within Anglo-American jurisdictions reveals a great distance between 
Damas̆ka’s understandable appeal to culpability and the practice of states 
that habitually disregard it.40 
                                                
36 JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 168 (1993) (“We agree with the negative retributivists, for republican 
reasons, that indeed only the guilty ought to be punished.”). 
37 Damas̆ka, supra note 5, at 470. 
38 Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 2, at 186; Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL 
04-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 15 (Feb. 22, 2008); Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, supra note 22, at 29. 
Strikingly, the better formulation was at Nuremberg: the Tribunal claimed that its 
reasoning was “in accordance with well-settled legal principles, one of the most 
important of which is that criminal guilt is personal, and that mass punishments should be 
avoided.” 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 499 (1947). 
39 MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 403 (2010) 
(acknowledging the dual meanings of culpability, but emphasizing that responsibility 
entails a voluntary and unjustified act that proximately causes harm, coupled with the 
obligation that “one must have done so culpably”). Fletcher, supra note 27, at 461 
(stipulating that the components of desert are wrongdoing and culpability). Note that 
culpability bears several meanings here. On the one hand, it is frequently used in a 
normative sense i.e. a person is culpable only if she is justifiably to blame for her 
conduct, as compared with the use of the term culpability in the US Model Penal Code to 
designate mental elements. For further discussion, see id., at 398. 
40 It is difficult to reconcile the extent of strict liability in many Anglo-American national 
systems with the view frequently expressed in international criminal scholarship that 
national departures from culpability are highly exceptional. In a survey of 165 new 
offenses created within England and Wales in 2005, Andrew Ashworth shows that strict 
liability was sufficient in 40%, plus an additional 26% were strict liability but watered 
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 How then is culpability to be measured? To begin, note that the 
content of requisite blameworthy choice varies from one international 
crime to the next. Indeed, the availability of different mental elements 
allows states, treaty-makers and sometimes judges to define crimes in 
such a way that each prohibits distinct moral transgressions. For some 
crimes, recklessness or negligence will suffice, whereas others are 
markedly more demanding in order to signal the particular moral 
magnitude of the violation. In the context of genocide, for instance, the 
requisite choice is not simply to kill individuals; it also involves carrying 
out these acts with a corresponding intention to “destroy, in whole or in 
part, a racial, ethnic, or religious group.”41 For many, this added 
psychological disposition is the quintessence of the crime—it is the 
element that distinguishes garden-variety murder from what Raphael 
Lemkin described as “barbarous practices reminiscent of the darkest pages 
of history.”42  
 One would think then that convicting someone of genocide without 
this special intent emasculates the crime. And yet, international courts 
have found that a member of a JCE could be found to have committed 
genocide, even though he merely foresaw that his colleagues might carry 
out the crime.43 For many scholars, this is theoretical heresy. David 
Nersessian, for example, describes JCE III as a form of “constructive 
liability”,44 a term he uses in contrast to direct forms of liability, because 
“theories of constructive liability… allow conviction for the same offense 
                                                                                                                     
down slightly by a proviso that the offense must be carried out “without reasonable 
excuse.” Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Law, Human Rights and Preventative Justice, in 
REGULATING DEVIANCE: THE REDIRECTION OF CRIMINALISATION AND THE FUTURES OF 
CRIMINAL LAW (Bernadette McSherry, Alan Norrie, & Simon Bronitt eds., 2008). Strict 
liability is just the tip of the iceberg. For a wide range of violations of culpability in the 
United States, see Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 617–
618 (1983) (discussing Pinkerton liability, the felony-murder rule, vicarious liability of 
officials of organizations, RICO and others). 
41 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 
S. EXEC. DOC. O 81-1 (1949) ,78 U.N.T.S. 277, in Article II. 
42 RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 90 (2008). 
43 Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, ¶ 6 
(Mar. 19, 2004) (holding that even when the crime charged is genocide, “the Prosecution 
will be required to establish that it was reasonably foreseeable to the accused that an act 
specified in Article 4(2) would be committed and that it would be committed with 
genocidal intent”.). For similar conclusions relating to other special intent crimes, see 
Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, ¶ 471 (Feb. 26, 2009) 
(convicting Šainović of persecution for the murder of Kosovo Albanians “even though 
falling outside of the object of the JCE, [the murders carried act to persecute were] 
reasonably forseeable to Šainović.”). 
44 David L. Nersessian, Whoops, I Committed Genocide - The Anomaly of Constructive 
Liability for Serious International Crimes, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 81, 82 (2006). 
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even though the requisite conduct and mental state are absent.”45 In 
articulating what makes these mechanisms objectionable, Nersessian 
draws on the principle of fair labeling.46 The concept was originally 
developed by Andrew Ashworth to describe the need for specificity in the 
label of a particular offense, rather than lumping together vastly different 
categories of offending.47 Even though this original purpose is less 
germane here, the underlying idea was that “[f]airness demands that 
offenders be labeled and punished in proportion to their wrongdoing.”48 
Otherwise, an accused is stigmatized by preconceptions associated with an 
offence that do not match his personal responsibility.  
 While I doubt that fair labeling (in the sense critics of international 
criminal justice use it) deserves an existence separate from culpability, it 
does alert us to an important insight—the label of a crime is a key element 
of punishment that must match an accused’s guilt, regardless of the 
number of years in prison an accused is to serve.49 This reading reinforces 
that conviction for a particular crime requires fidelity to its identity, which 
predictably, is contained in the crime’s definition. The physical and 
mental elements in the paradigm of the offence thus define what it means 
to be responsible for violating that prescription. Accordingly, convicting 
an individual of genocide for merely foreseeing the crime over-punishes. 
It misapplies the criminal label genocide, which is reserved for more 
                                                
45 Id. at 82. What this thoughtful criticism does not reveal is how aiding and abetting is 
also constructive, and that this point was instrumental in leading international courts to 
define JCE III similarly. Prosecutor v. Brđanin, supra note 43, at 5, 8 (“As a mode of 
liability, the third category of joint criminal enterprise is no different from other forms of 
criminal liability which do not require proof of intent to commit a crime on the part of an 
accused before criminal liability can attach. Aiding and abetting, which requires 
knowledge on the part of the accused and substantial contribution with that knowledge, is 
but one example.”). 
46 Id. at 96-98. 
47 Andrew Ashworth, The Elasticity of Mens Rea, in CRIME, PROOF AND PUNISHMENT: 
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR RUPERT CROSS, 53-56 (Colin Tapper ed.,) (referring to 
“representing labelling” as “the belief that the label applied to an offence ought fairly to 
represent the offender’s wrongdoing.” Ashworth’s prototypical illustration was the 
impropriety of merging the hitherto separate crimes of theft and obtaining by deception, 
which were thought to convey separate moral wrongs.); For further discussion, see also 
Glanville Williams, Convictions and Fair Labelling, 42 CAMBRIDGE L..J. 85 (1983); 
James Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, Fair Labelling in Criminal Law, 71 MODERN L. REV. 
217 (2008). To my mind, this principle does not enjoy a separate existence from 
culpability. This, because the label of a criminal conviction is a key component of a 
defendant’s punishment, and therefore must be reconciled with desert. 
48 Ashworth, supra note 47, at 53-56 (Referring to “representing labeling” as “the belief 
that the label applied to an offence ought fairly to represent the offender’s wrongdoing.”). 
49 James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick make this point well in describing the preferences 
of rape victims to have their assailants prosecuted for rape, even if this leads to lesser 
jail-terms. See Chalmers & Leverick, supra  note 47, at 217. 
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blameworthy conduct, then mis-conveys a degree of responsibility that is 
not paired to the defendant’s desert.   
 As Darryl Robinson convincingly argues, this is an aberration: “the 
[defendant] still faces the stigma of a conviction for committing genocide, 
while having satisfied neither the actus reus nor the hitherto indispensable 
mens rea for genocide”.50 The approach transgresses principles of 
culpability and fair labeling “by lumping together radically different levels 
of blameworthiness under one label.”51 While I am less convinced that 
international influences explain this position (as distinct from a 
combination of the Hitler-as-accomplice dilemma and readily available 
domestic tools like JCE), we are likely to share deep misgivings about the 
national justifications for the doctrine—calculating culpability as “a 
package deal”52 still escalates responsibility on policy grounds. 
 Jenny Martinez and Allison Marsten Danner also propose that “certain 
forms of joint criminal enterprise… that tolerate a reduced mens rea 
should not be used in cases involving specific intent crimes such as 
genocide and persecution.”53 Here too, there is a concern that the 
distinctive features of these serious crimes are “weakened by the lowering 
of the mental state to recklessness or negligence, as would occur in a 
Category Three JCE”.54 Although Martinez and Danner recommend closer 
attention to the principle of culpability in international criminal justice in 
                                                
50 Robinson, supra note 5, at 941. 
51 Id., at 941. 
52 Andrew Simester offers arguably the most famous defense of joint criminal liability at 
the national level. See A.P. Simester, The Mental Element in Complicity, 122 L.Q. REV. 
578, 599 (2006) (“[b]y forming a joint enterprise, S signs up to its goal. In so doing, she 
accepts responsibility for the wrongs perpetrated in realising that goal, even though they 
be done by someone else. Her joining with P in a common purpose means that she is no 
longer fully in command of how the purpose is achieved. Given that P is an autonomous 
agent, S cannot control the precise manner in which P acts. Yet her commitment to the 
common purpose implies an acceptance of the choices and actions that are taken by P in 
the course of realizing that purpose. Her responsibility for incidental offences is not 
unlimited: S cannot be said to accept the risk of wrongs by P that she does not foresee, or 
which depart radically from their shared enterprise, and joint enterprise liability rightly 
does not extend to such cases. Within these limitations, however, the execution of the 
common purpose-including its foreseen attendant risks-is a package deal. Just as risks 
attend the pursuit of the common purpose, an assumption of those risks flows from S’s 
subscription to that purpose.”); See also, George Fletcher’s helpful outline of the 
common justification for felony-murder. GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 193 (1998) (“The state justifiably threatens robbers who cause death with 
an additional punishment in order to make them, as it were, ”careful“ robbers-they should 
do everything possible to minimize the risk of death. Imposing this additional burden on 
them is not considered unjust, for they, as robbers, have embarked on a forbidden course 
of endangering human life.”). 
53 Danner and Martinez, supra note 5, at 79. 
54 Id., at 151. 
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order to bolster a fragile legitimacy, promote human rights and achieve 
transitional justice goals,55 their critique also underscores more 
deontological concerns for fairness to the accused—using JCE III to 
circumvent special intent inappropriately amplifies moral responsibility 
beyond the contours of the crime. 
 A final set of scholars reach the same conclusion, albeit on slightly 
different grounds. Antonio Cassese, for instance, argues that JCEIII may 
not be employed in conjunction with special intent crimes for two very 
compelling reasons.56 First, to do so would connote a “logical 
impossibility”,57 since one may not be held responsible for committing a 
crime that requires special intent unless that individual is proved to have 
the requisite special intent.58 Second, he convincingly argues that the 
“distance” between the subjective dispositions of the primary and 
secondary offenders must not be dramatic if they are both to be convicted 
of the same offense, otherwise personal culpability “would be torn to 
shreds.”59  
 Thus, to preserve analytical consistency, all modes of liability must 
require subjective standards that are the same as those announced in the 
definition of each particular crime. Otherwise, modes of liability warp 
responsibility as distinct form merely attributing wrongdoing in line with 
the moral weight of the crime in question. 
B. The Fundamentals of Action: Failures to Punish in Superior 
Responsibility 
  
 At the turn of the seventeenth century, the famed internationalist Hugo 
Grotius wrote, “we must accept the principle that he who knows of a 
crime, and is able and bound to prevent it but fails to do so, himself 
commits a crime.”60 The statement represented the beginnings of the 
                                                
55 Id. at 146. 
56 Cassese, supra note 25, at 121. 
57 Id. at 121. 
58 Id. at 121. 
59 Id. at 121; Elies van Sliedregt also explains this difference based on a distinction 
between perpetration and participation. The former forbids escalation whereas the later 
tolerates this. Elies van Sliedregt, Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting 
Individuals for Genocide, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 184 -207, 201 (2007). I later argue that 
if such a distinction makes little sense, since it is still inappropriate to convict someone of 
a crime they do not deserve, even if you have reduced the time they will spend in prison. 
See infra section IV.A. 
60 HUGO GROTIUS ET AL., HUGONIS GROTII DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES: IN QUIBUS 
JUS NATURAE & GENTIUM, ITEM JURIS PUBLICI PRÆCIPUA EXPLICANTUR 523 (1925). 
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modern doctrine of superior responsibility, but again it was not until 
domestic courts prosecuted the Japanese General Yamashita after WWII,61 
that the doctrine began its meteoric rise to prominence within international 
criminal justice. The doctrine’s modern popularity has stemmed, in large 
part, from its promise as a solution to the Hitler-as-accessory dilemma. To 
this end, superior responsibility must function as a mechanism through 
which the superior is deemed liable “for the crimes of his subordinates.”62 
Accordingly, superior responsibility emerged as a “mode of liability” with 
domestic backing that promised to overcome the insurmountable 
deficiencies of complicity and accurately capture the true moral 
responsibility of the puppet masters in atrocity.  
 Once again, the origins of the concept were largely domestic. To 
conclude a meticulous study of WWII jurisprudence governing superior 
responsibility (which in turn served as a foundation for modern iterations), 
Kevin Heller observes that “[n]one of the [WWII] tribunals, however, 
identified the precise ‘law of war’—conventional or customary—that 
justified imposing criminal liability on a military commander who failed 
to properly supervise his subordinates, much less on a civilian superior. 
Instead, they simply cited Yamashita, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 1949, for the existence of the mode of participation.”63 Much has 
transpired since, but this history undermines a thesis that broad modes of 
liability are necessarily hatched internationally. Quite the contrary, 
international courts enthusiastically embrace far-reaching doctrine once 
prominent domestic systems grant them their imprimatur.  
 Confusingly, there are several definitions of superior responsibility 
within international criminal law, but crudely speaking, a subordinate’s 
wrongdoing is attributed to the superior where she has effective control 
over the perpetrators of crimes and knew or had reason to know of their 
offenses, but failed to prevent or punish the perpetrators.64 Only a decade 
                                                
61 In Re: Yamashita 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946). For a detailed history of the case, see RICHARD 
L. LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT: WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY   
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW (1982). 
62 Prosecutor v. Halilović, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgment, ¶ 53 (Nov. 16, 2005); Amy J. 
Sepinwall, Failures to Punish: Command Responsibility in Domestic and International 
Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 251, 267 (2008) (completing a survey of previous practice by 
concluding that “there is overwhelming support for the mode of liability view.”). 
63 KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 262–263 (2011). 
64 For instance, Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute states: “The fact that any of the acts 
referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does 
not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that 
the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to 
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the 
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ago, however, Mirjan Damas̆ka alerted us that aspects of the old concept 
are inconsistent with first principles—convicting a superior of the same 
offence as his subordinate for merely failing to punish that subordinate 
violates the principle of culpability too,65 in this instance, because “the 
opprobrium attaches to [the superior] for heinous conduct to which he has 
in no way contributed”.66 Underlying Damas̆ka’s complaint lies the 
supposition that culpability presupposes personal participation in the 
wrongful conduct required for the crime of which the accused is 
convicted.67  
 Let us embark on a brief exegesis to explore the significance of this 
idea. Wrongful action requires that a defendant’s actions “must reflect on 
him in a way that makes the kind of criticism communicated by the 
imposition of criminal responsibility appropriate.”68 Murder requires 
actions that lead to death, rape requires insertion of a penis in a vagina, 
theft demands appropriation, and so forth. There can be no mix and 
match—an appropriation cannot be a murder and a killing cannot be theft. 
Thus, it is not acceptable that someone convicted of a crime did something 
morally reprehensible, if that action has no bearing on the content of the 
offense with which she is charged. These principles reflect basic liberal 
aspirations—in order to guard against the prospect of thought-crimes, guilt 
by association or punishment based on status, a wrongful act calibrated to 
the definition of the crime is widely regarded as “a primary candidate for a 
universal principle of criminal liability.”69  
  In traditional understandings, wrongful acts tend to divide into two 
camps. For one category of offences such as rape and fraud, conduct alone 
is sufficient since the action itself constitutes the criminal harm.70 To 
                                                                                                                     
perpetrators thereof.” (Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Article 7(2), Sept. 2008). 
65 Damas̆ka, supra note 5, at 468. 
66 Id. at 468. 
67 Id. at 469. 
68 Victor Tadros, for instance, points out that it is not sufficient that the defendant has 
acted wrongly in some way; as a minimum his actions “must reflect on him in a way that 
makes the kind of criticism communicated by the imposition of criminal responsibility 
appropriate.” VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 49 (2007) (emphasis in 
original). 
69 Fletcher, supra note 26, at 420. 
70 See Fletcher, supra note 26, at 61-62 (describing a basic cleavage in the criminal law, 
between crimes of harmful consequences and crimes of harmful actions).  Fletcher’s 
taxonomy elsewhere refers to patterns of manifest criminality, harmful consequences and 
subjective criminality (Fletcher, supra note 26, at 388-390). The last of these labels 
describes inchoate offenses, and therefore is not directly relevant here; This tripartite 
taxonomy emulates German criminal theory (Krey, supra note 34, at 151-153, discussing 
Erfolgsdelikte (result-oriented crimes), schlichte Tätigkeitsdelikte (non-result oriented 
crimes); and Verletzungsdelikte/Gefährdungsdelikte (crimes constituted by violation of 
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extrapolate into the international sphere, the war crime declaring that no 
quarter will be given merely requires the order not to take prisoners—it 
matters not whether injured or surrendering enemy soldiers are 
subsequently massacred in Lawrence of Arabia style, since the 
announcement itself suffices to commit the crime. In the second category 
of crimes, however, proof of harmful consequences is required. And for 
these harm-type crimes, “a causal connexion between some action of the 
accused and the specified harm must be shown in order to establish the 
existence of liability.”71  
 Two contrasting theories question this traditional thinking from 
opposing extremes, both of which are useful for understanding 
international criminal law’s philosophical stance on these issues. From 
one side, there are those who deny the conduct/harm division outright, 
arguing that causation is a quintessential element of responsibility across 
all criminal offences.72 Rape is not restricted to the conduct of inserting 
one’s penis into a woman’s vagina without consent, but denotes “causing 
sexual penetration of the female.”73 By analogy, the war crime of 
declaring no quarter is actually causing bodily movements in the throat, 
                                                                                                                     
legal interests/mere endangerment of legal interests).  The same distinction is true in both 
French and Spanish criminal law. See ALBIN ESER, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 105 (2002) (describing a distinction between “delito de mera actividad” 
and “delito de resultado” in the former, and “infraction formelle” and “infraction 
materielle” in the latter.). 
71 H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 79 (2nd ed. 1985) (emphasis 
in original). 
72  The criticism of the traditionalist division between conduct and harm type offenses is 
best made in MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, 
MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 101 (2009) ("The thesis is that all complex descriptions of 
actions share with `killing’ a built-in, second causal element: the bodily movement (that 
is caused by a volition) must itself cause some further, independent event to occur, like a 
death in the case of `killing’.);  But see John Gardner, Moore on Complicity and 
Causation, 156 U. PA L. REV. PENNUMBRA 432 (2008) (disagreeing that rape requires 
causation, because the offence demands “no result... other than the action in question 
having been performed”).  My own sympathies lie with Moore. Consider this 
hypothetical: if a patient is given an anesthetic in her arm before an operation, and a 
doctor asks her to raise her arm, she tries but fails because the arm is anesthetized. If the 
doctor asks her to raise her anesthetized arm a second time, but this time the doctor 
physically raises the patient’s arm at precisely the same time she makes her second 
attempt, we are still not able to say that the patient lifted her arm, even though she 
intended to raise it at precisely the same time that it did. Volition must cause action, 
therefore causation is common to all forms of responsibility. For helpful discussion, 
including arguments that would disagree with my hypothetical, see  R. A. Duff, Acting, 
Trying, and Criminal Liability, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 75-106, 83-85 
(Stephen Shute, John Gardner, & Jeremy Horder eds., New ed. 1995). 
73 MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, 
AND METAPHYSICS 16 (2009). 
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mouth and lips, which subsequently cause an announcement to one’s 
troops that no prisoners will be taken in battle. On this account of the 
philosophy of action, one can never escape causal analyses, even for what 
are commonly known as conduct-type crimes. The distinction between 
conduct and harm therefore disintegrates, leaving causation as a universal 
ingredient in blame attribution. 
 Others reach the diametrically opposite conclusion by denying 
causation any legitimate role in determining responsibility. These 
arguments rely heavily on thinking about moral luck—if we are 
committed to punishing people for what they deserve, surely they should 
not benefit from their luck.74 Why, after all, should a would-be murderer 
who shoots at her enemy be punished less, merely because the victim by 
chance dies of a heart attack seconds before the bullet hits?75 If we are 
serious about culpability as the metric upon which to judge responsibility, 
we must eliminate these types of fortuitous scenarios from our calculus. 
To do this requires nothing short of abolishing harm as a touchstone for 
criminal responsibility, and as a result, eliminating causation from the 
criminal lexicon. In its place, criminal offenses would always be inchoate 
in structure, making attempt the paradigm for criminal responsibility.  
 As a reflection of the inherent deference to domestic orthodoxy, 
international courts and tribunals reject both extremes. To illustrate, in 
determining the liability of leaders within the infamous Radio télévision 
libre des mille collines (RTLM) for instigating genocide, the Rwanda 
Tribunal distinguished instigation as a “mode of liability” from direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide, which operates as a separate 
inchoate crime. Like the conduct-type war crime of declaring no quarter, 
the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide “is 
completed as soon as the discourse in question is uttered or published”.76 
Whereas a showing of causation would be required to convict the radio 
owners for instigating genocide, for this inchoate crime a “causal 
                                                
74 For the classic discussion of this in English-speaking literature, see Thomas Nagel, 
Moral Luck, Supp 50 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELEAN SOCIETY (1976); For more 
recent discussion, see Andrew Ashworth, Taking the Consequences, in ACTION AND 
VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 107 (Stephen Shute, John Gardner, & Jeremy Horder eds., 
1995); Alexander and Ferzan, supra note 15, at 171-175. 
75  For an excellent overview of these arguments, see Alexander and Ferzan, supra note 
15 at 171-196 (arguing that only culpability, not resulting harm, affects desert"). For a 
response to these claims, which asserts the orthodox position that harm matters, see 
Moore, supra note 73, at 30 (arguing that we feel very differently about a drunk driver’s 
responsibility for swerving and only missing a child crossing the street by an inch, than 
we do if the drunk driver actually hits and kills the child.). 
76 Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, ¶ 723 (Nov. 28, 
2007). 
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relationship is not requisite to a finding of incitement.”77 So in contrast to 
the theory that causation represents the hidden structure of all criminal 
responsibility, international courts side with domestic example.  
 Likewise, arguments from moral luck have no real currency 
internationally—harm indisputably matters in international criminal 
justice. All range of international crimes, from deportation as a war crime 
to extermination as a crime against humanity, are defined in ways that 
make the actual occurrence of harm necessary for guilt. For the former, 
civilians must be expelled across a border; for the latter, members of a 
civilian population must perish.78 In some instances, international courts 
explicitly reinforce the normative significance of harm by explicitly 
stating that international crimes are not inchoate and that liability is 
contingent upon proof that the intended harm materialized.79 In sum, 
international criminal justice is highly deferential to domestic tradition, 
both in its practice of distinguishing harm-type and conduct-type offences 
along traditional lines and in considering harm a theoretical center-piece 
of criminal responsibility.  
 But why the mimicry? If we are truly committed to culpability as the 
guiding feature of blame attribution in international criminal justice, 
should we not have boldly dispensed with harm as the essence of 
international criminal responsibility, in favor of a system that better 
accounts for the problem of moral luck? Less ambitiously, is it not more 
                                                
77 Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, ¶ 1015 (Dec. 3, 
2003); this aspect of the Trial Chamber’s reasoning was affirmed on appeal. See 
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., supra note 76, at 678; for a concise articulation of the 
difference between instigation as mode of liability and incitement as inchoate offence, 
see Prosecutor v. Kalimanzira, Case No. ICTR-05-88-T, Judgment, ¶ 512 (June 20, 2009) 
(“Instigation under Article 6 (1) is a mode of liability; an accused will incur criminal 
responsibility only if the instigation in fact substantially contributed to the commission of 
one of the crimes under Articles 2 to 4 of the Statute. By contrast, direct and public 
incitement is itself a crime, requiring no demonstration that it in fact contributed in any 
way to the commission of acts of genocide.”). 
78 “(1) The perpetrator killed one or more persons, including by inflicting conditions of 
life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population; (2) The conduct 
constituted, or took place as part of a mass killing of members of a civilian population.” 
Elements of Crimes, Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, First session, New York, 3-10 September 
2002 [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes], at 6; “The perpetrator deported or transferred 
one or more persons to another State or to another location.” Id., at 17. 
79 Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., supra note 43, at 92 (“liability for aiding and abetting 
under the Statute cannot be inchoate: the accused cannot be held responsible under 
Article 7(1) for aiding and abetting if a crime or underlying offence is never actually 
carried out with his assistance, encouragement, or moral support.”); Prosecutor v. 
Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, ¶ 378 (May 15, 2003) (“Article 6(1) does 
not criminalize inchoate offences”.). 
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coherent to dispense with the traditional distinction between harm-type 
and conduct-type offences, to acknowledge that causation is common to 
both? That international criminal justice adopts neither of these positions 
again reflects the pull of domestic influence, not some nefarious utilitarian 
agenda derived from its international political status. The absence of any 
domestic practice adopting these theories has obviated the need for 
international criminal jurisdictions to choose between competing models, 
leaving them to contentedly follow established domestic doctrine 
regardless of whether it accords with principle.   
  This leads us back to superior responsibility, where international 
criminal justice’s traditionalism plays out most keenly. To begin, we must 
acknowledge that one might dispute whether superior responsibility is the 
ideal illustration of these philosophical principles in action insofar as it 
involves liability for an omission. There is broad dispute in criminal 
theory whether omissions cause anything. On the on hand, there are those 
who consider that an omission is “nothing at all,”80 which gives rise to the 
conclusion that omissions cannot cause anything—“nothing comes of 
nothing, and nothing ever could.”81 Conversely, social theories of 
causation posit that we ordinarily explain omissions as having causal 
power.82 We have no problem, for instance, saying that “a lack of rain 
causes crops to fail.”83 The debate need not delay us here though, since 
both judicial and scholarly discussions of superior responsibility assume a 
causal structure, and perhaps more pertinently, the question is largely 
peripheral to our central focus on accessorial liability. 
 How then do these foundational principles play own within superior 
responsibility? Intriguingly, misgivings about causation have prompted 
international courts to offer two corrections to the law governing failures 
to punish. The first is largely cosmetic—in response to the complaint that 
failures to punish convicted defendants of harm-type offenses without 
establishing causation, international criminal courts began adding 
language to the pertinent sections of their judgments professing that “an 
accused is not charged with the crimes of his subordinates but with his 
failure to carry out his duty as a superior to exercise control.”84 This 
language, however, has proved more of a smokescreen to ward off 
                                                
80 Moore, supra note 73, at 55. 
81 Id., See also, I; HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK & THOMAS WEIGEND, LEHRBUCH DES 
STRAFRECHTS. ALLGEMEINER TEIL. 618 (1996) (also doubting that omissions are causal 
insofar as they lack “a real source of energy.”) 
82 GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 64 (1998). 
83 VICTOR TADROS, supra note 68, at 171-172 (2007). 
84 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, ¶ 171 (Sept. 17, 2003). 
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conceptual criticisms than a marked normative change,85 but the important 
point is that the rhetoric became important to quell theoretical unease with 
the doctrine’s overreach, and that causation was the grounds for the 
discomfort.  
 In contrast, the second judicial correction was more radical. 
Several Trial Chambers convicted military commanders of a separate 
offence of “failing to take the necessary and reasonable measures to 
punish”,86 then proceeded to hand down drastically reduced sentences 
commensurate with the commanders’ failure to act (as distinct from the 
harm associated with a crime such as torture, extermination or 
genocide).87 This transformation of superior responsibility from a mode of 
liability to a separate lesser conduct-type crime was born of major 
theoretical misgivings—there is no logically plausible means of 
reconciling failures to punish with causation.88 How, after all, can a 
commander cause a crime that is already complete by the time she is 
impelled to act? The solution then was to dispense with causation by 
transforming failures to punish into a form closer to attempt.  
 For the same reasons, the vast majority of academics agree that 
failures to punish must constitute a separate conduct-type offense, given 
the impossibility of the commander’s failure causing the subordinate’s 
crime.89 With respect to a crime subordinates have already committed, 
                                                
85 I view this language as largely cosmetic because it conceals the long history of holding 
the superior responsible “for the crimes of his subordinates,” and more significantly, 
belies the ongoing practice of using superior responsibility to convict military and 
civilian commanders of “rape,” “pillage” and “genocide” carried out by underlings. For 
instance, “The Accused Ljubomir Borovčanin is found GUILTY pursuant to Article 7(3) 
of the Statute, of the following counts: Count 4: Murder, as a crime against humanity.”;  
Prosecutor v. Popović et. al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgment, ¶ 835, (June 10, 2010). 
Thus, it seem clear that the superior is still convicted of the crime his subordinates 
perpetrated. For a more detailed confirmation of this reasoning, see Robinson, supra note 
5, at 951-952. 
86 Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment, ¶ 620-628 
(Mar. 15, 2006) (finding Amir Kubura, for instance, “GUILTY of failing to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to punish the murder of Mladen Havranek at the 
Slavonija Furniture Salon in Bugojno on 5 August 1993.” The judgment’s entire 
disposition followed this approach). 
87 Id. at 625, 627.(sentencing Enver Hadzihasanovic to 5 years imprisonment and Amir 
Kubura to 2.5 years for failing to prevent or punish war crimes). 
88 Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-A, Judgment, ¶ 38 (Apr. 
22, 2008);  citing Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment,  ¶ 77 (Jul. 29, 
2004); Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 832 (Dec. 
17, 2004). 
89 Thomas Weigend, Bemerkungen zur Vorgesetztenverantwortlichkeit im 
Völkerstrafrecht, 116 BEMERKUNGEN ZUR VORGESETZTENVERANTWORTLICHKEIT IM 
VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT 999, 1021 (2004); Bing Bing Jia, The Doctrine of Command 
Responsibility Revisited, 3 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004), (“[b]ut it makes no sense to see 
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causality is “logically impossible” since later events cannot cause earlier 
ones.90 And as far as future crimes go, giving failures to punish a separate 
existence where crimes have yet to occur would require an absurdity: “to 
initiate prosecution of a crime that has not yet been committed.” 91 On this 
basis, the problem of causation within failures to punish “has not and 
arguably cannot be resolved.”92 In sum total, using failure to punish as a 
vehicle for convicting the superior of the same offence as the subordinate 
is “largely disproportionate.” 93  
 Admittedly, a minority of scholars in international criminal justice do 
reach the opposite view, but strikingly, their disagreement consistently 
attempts to reconcile failures to punish with causation rather than simply 
denying that the concept is necessary.94 Otto Triffterer, for example, 
argues that failures to punish are based on a double causal connection to 
the offense: the first flows from the superior’s initial omission to control 
the subordinates; the second derives from the failure to exercise a “second 
chance” to absolve himself by referring the matter to justice.95 Many find 
                                                                                                                     
failure to punish in the same light, which should be treated as an offence independent of 
subordinate crimes that raise the issue of command responsibility in the first place.”); 
Robinson, supra note 5, at 951 (“[e]ven if we agree that failure to punish crimes is 
worthy of criminalization, it is simply inaccurate to label such a failure as ‘genocide’.”); 
Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of 
Subordinates or Separate Offence of the Superior?, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 619, 636 
(2007), (“with regard to the failure to punish, where no real causal link subsists between 
the subsequent failure to act of the superior and the crime previously committed, the 
conviction of the superior for the same crime committed by the subordinates is difficult 
to justify.”); Elies van Sliedregt, Article 28 of the ICC Statute: Mode of Liability and/or 
Separate Offense, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 420, 431-432 (2009) (arguing that superior 
responsibility has different structures in different jurisdictions, but recommending the 
“splitting solution” involving treating failures to punish as a separate crime.). 
90 Weigend, supra note 89, at 1021. 
91 Id. at 1021. 
92 Id.; See opinion to similar effect supra note 83. 
93 Weigend, supra note 89, at 1021. 
94 Otto Triffterer, Causality, a Separate Element of the Doctrine of Superior 
Responsibility as Expressed in Article 28 Rome Statute?, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L., 203 
(2002) (arguing that causation is embedded in the structure of superior responsibility); 
GUÉNAËL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 42-43 (1st ed. 2009) 
(accepting that superior responsibility is a mode of liability, and rejecting the view that 
the doctrine of superior responsibility contains no requirement of causality). 
95 Triffterer, supra note 94, at 203. Use of the word “absolve” in the text is my own. I use 
this in anticipation of a criticism that Triffterer’s “second chance” is causally 
unnecessary if the failure to control is already adequate. With this modification, I believe 
his account is coherent causally, even if I harbor grave doubts whether the causal element 
could ever match the requisite subjective element of the subordinate’s crime at the time 
of perpetration. 
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this explanation unsatisfying,96 but its attempt to justify the mode of 
liability view in causal terms surely highlights the significance causation 
plays in any robust theory of blame attribution, at least for harm-type 
offences.  
  Only one scholar begs to differ. In her excellent article, Amy 
Sepinwall makes the strongest case for treating the failure to punish as a 
mode of liability by pointing out how “failure to punish can be read as an 
expression of his support for his troops’ act.”97 She argues that because 
the superior intends the failure, he aligns himself with the subordinate’s 
atrocity.98 In so doing, the commander compounds his subordinates’ 
offense, such that “he ought to be held criminally liable for it.”99 Although 
I have some sympathy for this explanation,100 it unjustifiably snubs the 
philosophical rationale that makes causation central to theories of criminal 
responsibility everywhere. Without it, we abandon the project of creating 
an objective connection between an accusers action and the harm to which 
international criminal justice assigns moral weight in calculating 
responsibility, leaving little principled protection against thought-crimes, 
guilt by association, punishment based on status or other innovative 
doctrine that allow policy to supersede desert.  
 Thus, if international criminal justice is to become coherent not harsh, 
causation is an indispensable element for the perpetration of all harm-type 
offences. There is, however, one final twist in this plot. For secondary 
parties, the harm/conduct distinction disappears because the derivative 
nature of the secondary party’s liability creates a cause-like 
relationship.101 The war crime of declaring no quarter is a conduct-type 
war crime (insofar as the consequences of the declaration are legally 
immaterial), but assessing whether a superior can be convicted of the 
crime for failing to punish a subordinate who made the announcement 
demands causation too. How else can we justify convicting the superior of 
                                                
96 Weigend, supra note 89, at 1021; Meloni, supra note 89, at 630. 
97 Sepinwall, supra note 63, at 289. 
98 Id. at 292. 
99 Id. at 295. 
100 Her argument is, for instance, a wonderful explanation of why failures to punish must 
be criminalized in the face of fears of over-criminalization more broadly. See DOUGLAS 
N. HUSAK, OVER CRIMINALIZATION (2008). Nonetheless, my own view is that a separate 
conduct-based crime remains the appropriate form of liability, since the superior makes 
no difference to a completed atrocity. 
101 Sanford H Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of 
Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 337 (1985) (“the notion of derivativeness can be 
expressed as well in terms of the requirement of a result: just as causation doctrine 
requires that the prohibited result occur before there can be an issue of the actor having 
caused it, so in complicity doctrine there must be a violation of law by the principal 
before there can be an issue of the secondary party’s liability for it.”). 
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this particular war crime, other than by showing that his actions made a 
difference to someone else committing the offense? Thus, if the vast 
majority of scholars in international criminal justice assume valid 
foundations in their criticisms of superior responsibility, causality must be 
an element of all “modes of liability” within the discipline. 
 
III. THE CONCEPTUAL SHORTCOMINGS OF COMPLICITY 
 
 The previous section identified two benchmarks for testing the 
theoretical merit of modes of liability that emerge from scholarship in 
international criminal justice. First, there is a conceptual need for 
congruence between the mental element in the crime and that required for 
the mode of liability; and second, an accused’s acts must be causally 
connected to the harm contemplated in the crime of which she is 
ultimately convicted. Before we apply these same benchmarks to 
complicity, we must first interrogate the nature of accessorial liability in 
order to establish that a comparison across different modes of liability is 
methodologically defensible. 
A. The Nature of Complicity – Two Defining Features 
1. Complicity as “Mode of Liability” 
 
 In his memorable treatise on accomplice liability, K.J.M Smith 
eloquently forewarned that “[s]urveying complicity's hazy theoretical 
landscape can, depending on the commentator's nerve, temperament, and 
resilience, induce feelings running from hand-rubbing relish to hand-on-
the-brow gloom.”102 My analysis sails much closer to the gloom than the 
relish, for there is much in the peripheries of complicity that is deeply 
unsatisfying. The question remains, however, to what extent complicity 
can be compared to other modes of liability, and if it is abandoned in favor 
of a unitary theory of perpetration, what features of complicity will a 
unitary theory have to accommodate? The first prerequisite is that 
complicity must act as a mode of liability too. 
 In domestic law, it traditionally does precisely this. In the Anglo-
American tradition, for example, “the accomplice is guilty of the same 
                                                
102 K. J. M. SMITH, A MODERN TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL COMPLICITY 4 
(1991). 
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offense as the principle.”103 The driver of the getaway car, in other words, 
is convicted of the same offense as her confederates who hold up the bank 
at gunpoint, even though the getaway driver does not personally steal a 
thing. Civil law countries follow this approach too, although the similarity 
is sometime overlooked in disparate approaches to sentencing. In 
Germany, for instance, aiders and abettors are sentenced to a maximum of 
three quarters of the penalty for the offense they facilitate whereas the 
sentence for instigators is taken from the same sentence range as 
principals.104 If one wonders how the great diversity of complicitous acts 
could consistently square with such neat mathematical divisions,105 the 
rule’s apparent rigidity should not cloud our vision of complicity’s 
overarching structure—regardless of how the accomplice’s sentence is to 
be calculated, these systems unequivocally hold the accessory liable for 
the rape, theft or murder that she assists in bringing to fruition. 
Some national jurisdictions take the equivalence between 
perpetration and complicity one step further. In France and England, 
criminal legislation explicitly stipulates that the accomplice “shall be 
liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal offender.”106 In 
other words, not only is the label “robbery” common to the sanction 
visited on the robber and her getaway driver, both offenders warrant 
potentially equivalent punishment. In light of these principles, one shares 
George Fletcher’s bewilderment “why the French and Anglo-American 
systems ever recognized distinctions among perpetrators, joint 
perpetrators and accomplices.”107 I return to this question in due course, 
but for now it is sufficient to observe that domestic jurisdictions have 
traditionally (but not invariably) viewed complicity of a mode of liability 
                                                
103 Sullivan, supra note 15, at 154; Fletcher, supra note 34, at 649-650 (“Aiding another 
person to commit a crime renders one an accomplice, and being an accomplice is simply 
one way of ‘being guilty of an offence.’”). 
104 Strafgesetzbuch, § 26, 27 and 49. For a modern English translation, see MICHAEL 
BOHLANDER, THE GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE: A MODERN ENGLISH TRANSLATION 43, 50 
(2008). 
105 Is it not possible that some rogue aider is five sixths as culpable as the perpetrator?   
As Michael Moore has argued, “[o]ne could say that, on average, accomplices are less-
substantial causers than are the principals they aid, and this is true enough. Yet this is 
only a rule of thumb, something that is true in the general run of causes.” Moore, supra 
note 17, at 423; And in fact, the intuition that the indirect nature of the accomplice’s acts 
render her less culpable is “surprisingly difficult to justify”. CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, 
COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 147 (2000) (discussing whether 
complicit actors are less culpable than direct actors). For further discussion, see Fletcher, 
supra note 34, at 654-657 (addressing the rationale for categorically mitigating the 
accessory’s punishment.). 
106 The Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c.98), s. 8 (emphasis added). 
107 Fletcher, supra note 33, at 651. 
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through which one becomes responsible for the perpetrator’s crime 
regardless of sentencing policy. 
 This history has notable modern exceptions. Contrary to earlier 
understandings that there is no crime of “being an accessory”,108 some 
domestic jurisdictions have since passed an inchoate offense called 
criminal facilitation.109 These new inchoate offenses, which generally co-
exist alongside orthodox notions of complicity, are inspired by the view 
that accessorial liability need not function as a mode of liability.110 Once 
again, moral luck provides one important rationale for the modern 
inchoate variations of complicity—why should the accomplice who sends 
a crowbar to assist a prison breakout be acquitted of the offence only 
because the inmate fortuitously manages to escape without it? In terms of 
desert, this is undoubtedly perplexing—“[w]hether the aid is actually 
rendered is fortuitous; the actor is equally culpable and his dangerousness 
is equally great if the perpetrator never receives the aid.”111 In addition, 
some doubt that an accomplice can ever cause a perpetrator with capacity 
for autonomous choice to commit a crime,112 offering a further basis for 
adding an inchoate version of complicity that excludes causal inquiries 
outright. 
                                                
108 Id. at 582 (“the actor is punished for a violation of the same prohibitory norm that 
covers standard cases of perpetration. There is no crime of … 'being an accessory’”.). 
109 In England and Wales, sections 44, 45 and 46 of the Serious Crimes 2007 create three 
new inchoate crimes of intentionally encouraging or assisting an offence; Encouraging or 
Assisting an Offence believing it will be committed; and encouraging or assisting 
offences believing one or more will be committed. For commentary, see ANDREW 
ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 458–461 (6 ed. 2009). In the United States, 
similar offenses are labeled criminal facilitation. For discussion, see Robert Weisberg, 
Reappraising Complicity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 261-270 (2000). 
110 Christopher Kutz, Causeless Complicity, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 239, 301 (2007) (arguing 
that causality should play no role in complicity, in part, in order to limit the role of moral 
luck in criminal law). For similar sorts of arguments, see Richard Buxton, Complicity 
and the Law Commission, CRIM. L. REV. 223 (1973) (“the way out of these and other 
difficulties would be to create a general offence of aiding or encouraging crime, 
committed by one who does acts which are known to be likely to be of assistance or 
encouragement to another in committing crime, whether or not that principal crime is in 
fact committed.”); Daniel Yeager, Helping, Doing, and the Grammar of Complicity, 15 
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 25 (1996) (“harm principles should have little or nothing to do with 
the law of complicity.”); Michael Moore summarizes these arguments succinctly by 
claiming that “(on this view) accomplice liability is just inchoate liability in the special 
cases when the evil sought to be prevented by the law has occurred (even though the 
accomplice did not cause it to occur).” Moore, supra note 13, at 401. Note, however, that 
several of these authors would eliminate this special requirement that the harm occurred, 
making complicity resemble attempt even more closely than Moore suggests. 
111 Fletcher, supra note 26, at 679. 
112 Yeager, supra note 110, at 31. 
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Where does complicity in international criminal justice stand on 
these competing visions of accessorial liability? As one might expect, it 
unquestioningly rejects the modern avant-garde in favor of tradition. 
Without doubt, international courts do not treat complicity as a separate 
inchoate offense. A range of international courts, both historical and 
contemporary, have convicted accessories of the same offense as the 
perpetrator and done so while openly referring to aiding and abetting as a 
“mode of liability.”113 As further and decisive evidence of this reality, the 
terms aiding and abetting, instigating, or any other of complicity’s 
numerous synonyms never feature in the dispositions of international 
criminal judgments in the overwhelming majority of instances.114 In 
expressing condemnation of an accessory’s conduct, international courts 
merely report that the defendant is responsible for crime X; we are not 
told why.115  
 Indeed, there is much to commend this orthodox view of 
complicity. Under an inchoate version, the vendors of the chemical 
Zyklon B used as an asphyxiant in Auschwitz would be convicted of 
criminal facilitation—not murder, extermination or genocide.116 This 
alternative may overcome evidential difficulties proving complicity, but it 
also gravely undervalues culpability to convict the vendors of the 
chemical used to gas in excess of four million people of criminal 
facilitation. Whatever one might think about the merit of creating a new 
inchoate version of complicity to complement the more traditional 
equivalent, when the crime (here genocide) does take place and the 
accomplice’s actions make an unequivocal contribution to the criminal 
                                                
113 Fletcher, supra note 26, at 637 (defining accessorial liability as "“all those who are 
held derivately liable for another’s committing the offense.”). 
114  The typical international trial alleging complicity concludes abruptly by declaring: 
“The Accused RADOSLAV BRDANIN is found not guilty under Article 7(3) of the 
Statute but GUILTY pursuant to Article 7(1) of the following counts: Count 3 – 
Persecutions...” Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 1152 (Sep. 1, 
2004); A comprehensive review of all convictions for aiding and abetting, instigation, 
planning and ordering reveals that international courts and tribunals follow this format in 
fifty-nine (59) other situations i.e. making no mention of the mode of liability within the 
disposition of the judgment. In only three (3) scenarios, international courts state 
something like: “The Chamber finds the Accused Haradin Bala GUILTY, pursuant to 
Article 7(1) of the Statute, of the following counts: Count 4 - Torture, a violation of the 
laws or customs of war, under Article 3 of the Statue, for having aided the torture of 
L12.” Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 41 (Nov. 30, 2005). 
Thus in over 95% of cases, international court’s dispositions make no mention of 
complicity, even though it was the basis for conviction. 
115 Id. 
116  See UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two 
Others “The Zyklon B Case”, 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93. 
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harm (here providing the means),117 convicting the accomplice of an 
inchoate offense is at best like convicting an actual murderer of attempted 
murder.118 If harm matters, mere facilitation is inadequate.  
 So, for better or worst, international criminal justice understands 
complicity in traditionalist form. In fact, such is the comfort with the 
unquestioning international dependence on pre-established traditional 
notions of complicity that there are few arguments that the doctrine might 
take inchoate form in international criminal justice. So somewhat 
strangely, the highly charged judicial and academic debate over whether 
failures to punish in superior responsibility should constitute a separate 
inchoate offense finds no parallel in the international law governing 
complicity, even though the issues are broadly analogous. The essential 
consequence of all this is therefore that causation must be an element of 
accomplice liability in order to honor the philosophical commitments 
international criminal law has inherited from below. 
   
2. The Derivative Nature of Accessorial Liability 
 
 One further feature of complicity requires introduction as 
background too. The second defining feature of accessorial liability both 
internationally and domestically is that it is commonly known as a form of 
“derivative liability.”119 Even the most nefarious accessory, who does 
everything in her power to facilitate someone else’s crime, is not complicit 
in anything if a perpetrator does not act wrongfully. If X sends a crowbar 
to her friend Y in prison in order for Y to use it to break out of prison, 
there is no crime if, unbeknownst to X, Y has independently broken out a 
week before the crowbar arrives at its destination. True, this again raises 
the perennial problem of moral luck (why should X benefit from Y’s 
fortuitous earlier breakout), but the long history of complicity has almost 
                                                
117 Assume for the sake of this argument that Bruno Tesch’s company Tesch & Stabenow 
was the only available supplier of the means of exterminating such a large number of 
civilians, such that their contribution was an indispensible cause of the crime. In fact, as I 
detail below, this is not factually accurate, but my minor factual modification makes the 
normative point indisputable. 
118 Actually, convicting those who intentionally provide chemicals for a genocide that 
subsequently takes place is even more objectionable than convicting an actual murder of 
attempted murder, because the label attempted murder at least communicates the gravity 
of the offense involved. Criminal facilitation communicates nothing of the sort, and to 
the extent that the label of the crime is a key element in the punishment inflicted on an 
accused, this significantly under-represents desert. 
119 Fletcher, supra note 26, at 637 (defining accessorial liability as "all those who are held 
derivately liable for another’s committing the offense.”). 
2011] THE END OF “MODES OF LIABILITY” 34 
   
invariably defined complicity as contingent upon the wrongdoing of a 
perpetrator.  
 Historically, this dependence was so intense that the accomplice 
would escape prosecution if the principal perpetrator was never 
apprehended, prosecuted and convicted.120 For instance, until the 
eighteenth century no accessory could be convicted if his principal had 
died, received pardon by clergy, or had not been convicted for any reason 
at all.121 In England it was only in 1848 that it became possible to indict, 
try, convict and punish an accessory before the fact “in all respects as if he 
were a principal felon”,122 regardless of whether the perpetrator was first 
brought to trial and convicted. Around the same time, Continental systems 
made a similar shift, which reduced the principal’s perpetration of the 
crime to a contested issue within the accessory’s trial. While these 
changes meant that the formal reliance on derivative liability within 
complicity was less strict, it remained a central feature of the doctrine.  
 The derivative nature of accomplice liability was later further 
diluted but again leaving the basic concept intact. In most national 
jurisdictions, an accomplice can now be held responsible where the 
principal perpetrator’s crime is excused, say when an accomplice assists 
someone insane to commit a crime. As a result, complicity is now viewed 
as entailing only a “limited or partially derivative character.”123 Although 
the moral basis for this dilution is obvious, it also gives rise to 
downstream complications. How do we determine the responsibility of 
someone who gives you a gun intending that you kill Mr. W, but 
fortuitously, Mr. W attacks you first and you kill him with the gun in self-
defense?124  While cases of this sort involving culpable intentions on the 
accomplice’s part but justified actions on the perpetrator’s are complex, 
the complexity does not eclipse the overraching principle—the vast 
                                                
120 Dubber, supra note 7, at 982 (showing how a putative accomplice would “[e]scape 
trial and punishment if the principal was never found, was never prosecuted, was 
acquitted, was convicted but had his conviction overturned or was pardoned.”) . 
121 Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. 
REV. 689, 695 (1929); Smith, supra note 102, at 20-23. 
122 Sayre, supra note 121, at 695. 
123 Hans-Ludwig Schreiber, Problems of Justification and Excuse in the Setting of 
Accessorial Conduct, 1986 BYU L. REV. 611, 620 (highlighting how the notion of 
limitierte Akzessorietat was not developed in German criminal law until 1943). 
124 For even more complicated variants of my example, see Fletcher, supra note 27, at 
667-669 (discussing inconsistent American case law on the issue of whether a 
confederate of a criminal who is justifiably shot by police while fleeing the crime-scene 
can be an accomplice in the death of his confederate.); Hans-Ludwig Schreiber, supra 
note 123, at 629-630 (discussing a scenario where the “accomplice” deliberately initiates 
a situation where you kill Mr. W in self defense.). 
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majority of domestic criminal systems still maintain that the accessory’s 
liability is contingent on the principle perpetrator’s wrongdoing.  
 Once again, international criminal courts follow domestic 
influence, here explicitly. In a leading case on point, the ICTR embraced 
the derivative nature of complicity by again relying on domestic 
examples, this time in the form of the French criminal law. As a reflection 
of a trend that international criminal tribunals repeat consistently, the 
tribunal acknowledged that this notion implies that “[t]he accomplice has 
not committed an autonomous crime, but has merely facilitated the 
criminal enterprise committed by another.”125 In particular, it declared that 
“complicity is borrowed criminality (criminalité d'emprunt).”126 In 
drawing on this notion of criminalité d'emprunt, the Tribunal did not 
register that the label is a relic of 18th century criminal reform, and that 
leading French academics in the modern era view it as “[u]ne expression 
vicieuse”.127 Although the matter has no substantive importance for 
present purposes, the process of absorption marks an important theme—by 
borrowing domestic doctrine (not leading theory), international courts 
incorporate the historical idiosyncrasies of national criminal systems 
regardless of their compliance with foundational principles.  
  But is there a danger that complicity borrows too much? In 
addressing this problem, scholars in domestic criminal theory are earnest 
to ward off allegations that derivative liability amounts to vicarious 
liability. The former is justifiable, the latter anathema to liberal notions of 
criminal justice. Sandy Kadish, for example, pleads that we (like 
Eichmann) should not misconstrue the two terms—vicarious liability is 
nothing more than punishment based on a relationship between the parties, 
whereas derivative liability requires action and blameworthy choice on the 
part of the secondary party, “mak[ing] it appropriate to blame him for 
what the primary actor does.”128 But Kadish’s bright-line distinction begs 
the more nuanced question. How distant are vicarious and derivative 
liability really? In other words, what type of action and choice will suffice 
to blame the accomplice for “what the primary actor does,” especially 
when the accessory’s act and choice is not stipulated in the offense with 
which she will ultimately be convicted? With an understanding of 
complicity’s conceptual identity in international criminal justice, we now 
turn to this dilemma.  
                                                
125 Id. at 528. 
126 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 528 (Sep. 2, 1998) 
127 Robert, supra note 8, at 351; See also Philippe Salvage, Le lien de causalité en 
matière de complicité, REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PÉNAL COMPARÉ 25, 
41 (1981). 
128 Kadish, supra note 101, at 337. 
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B. The Mental Element for Complicity 
 
 The mental element for accessorial liability is highly debated and 
inconsistently applied at both international and domestic levels. Most 
international criminal tribunals formally insist that “the requisite mental 
element is knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor 
assist the commission of the specific crime of the principal”,129 and justify 
the adoption of this standard as the embodiment of customary 
international law. Conversely, the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court demands that the accessory assist the perpetrator “[f]or the purpose 
of facilitating the commission of such a crime”.130 The intensity of 
volition then, formally distinguishes complicity within competing 
international incarnations of the doctrine. And yet, this formalism 
conceals the reality that neither of these standards is that actually applied 
most often in practice, and more importantly, that no single static standard 
is theoretically defensible. 
 To begin, note the competing rationale for the purpose and 
knowledge standards. The purpose standard is said to promote autonomy 
by precluding criminal impediments to otherwise lawful activities that 
depend on social interaction, especially business. The knowledge 
standard, on the other hand, promotes social control and the prevention of 
crime by demanding that agents take interventionist action when aware 
that their actions are enabling offending.131 In its most ambitious guise, 
the knowledge standard posits that the potential aider “might be an 
educative or moralizing force that causes the would-be offender to change 
his mind.”132 Given the magnitude of international crimes, the knowledge 
standard would seem the more reasonable rationale for our purposes, and 
yet both accounts miss the mark. 
At the level of doctrine, the famed purpose/knowledge dichotomy 
glosses over a complex literature arguing that the accomplice liability 
actually involves “two dimensional fault”,133 which goes to the assistance 
provided, the perpetrator’s intentions, and/or the ultimate crime 
                                                
129 Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, supra note 22, at 102; Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL 
04-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 145 (Aug. 2, 2007); Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-
96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, Judgment, ¶ 501 (Dec 13, 2004). 
130 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art 25 (3)(c), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 
July 17, 1998. 
131 Louis Westerfield, The Mens Rea Requirement of Accomplice Liability in American 
Criminal Law - Knowledge or Intent, 51 MISS. L.J. 155, 178 (1980). 
132 Id. 
133 Ashworth, supra note 109, at 415;  This also reflects the state of the law in German 
criminal law, see Bohlander, supra note 2, at 168 (discussing “doppelter Anstifter- und 
Gehilfenvorsatz" twofold intent of the aider or abettor). 
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facilitated.134 Later, I argue that it possible to transcend these intermediary 
steps by inquiring whether the accomplice satisfies the mental element of 
the crime itself. For present purposes though, it suffices to recognize that 
in international criminal justice, these types of technicalities are 
completely overshadowed by the intensity of the contest between the 
knowledge and purpose strands. Thus, when the US Supreme Court was 
asked to hear allegations that a company was complicit in crimes 
perpetrated within Apartheid South Africa, it faced a veritable deluge of 
argument for either side of the purpose/knowledge divide.135 
The dichotomy, like many other international modes of liability, is 
inherited from international criminal law’s domestic forbearers. The 
International Criminal Court’s reliance on purpose was (perhaps 
unfaithfully) drawn from a similar standard in the American Law 
Institute’s Model Penal Code, which appears to require that an accomplice 
provide assistance with the purpose of facilitating the crime.136 In contrast, 
other international criminal courts have drawn inspiration from the vast 
array of national systems and earlier international precedents, which 
merely require that an accomplice provide assistance to the perpetrator 
knowing that her actions facilitate the crime. Therefore, to the extent that 
                                                
134 Smith, supra note 87, at 141-197 (reviewing English and American jurisprudence 
requiring that the accessory must intend his acts of assistance or encouragement and be 
aware of their ability to assist or encourage the principal offender, then exploring the 
complexities of these two variations); GLANVILLE LLEWELYN WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL 
LAW: THE GENERAL PART 394-396 (1953) (reviewing the multiple mental elements 
required for the accomplice); Eser, supra note 70 at 923-924 (discussing the “double 
intent” in complicity derived from German criminal law). 
135  For comprehensive analyses, see Keitner, supra note 7, at 86-96; Doug Cassel, 
Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 
NW. UNIV. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304, 308-315 (2007). 
136 I say perhaps unfaithfully because the Model Penal Code also has a strange provision 
requiring that “[w]hen causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an 
accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that 
offense if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is 
sufficient for the commission of the offense.” See Model Penal Code Commentaries 
(Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1985), § 2.06, 296. The significance of this 
provision is opaque. See Grace E Mueller, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 2169, 2178 (1987) (pointing out that there is some ambiguitiy arising from 
this provision about how to address the accomplice’s knowledge of circumstances. but 
arguing that the accomplice should be required to show the same mental element as that 
required for perpetration);  In any event, even US Federal standards of complicity have 
varied wildly, involving knowledge, purpose, recklessness and a unitary theory. See 
Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor 
and the Causer under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1486 (2001) (reviewing 
the relevant caselaw and advocating for the unitary theory, which he describes as a 
“derivative approach”). 
2011] THE END OF “MODES OF LIABILITY” 38 
   
complicity is a doctrine deeply divided in international criminal justice, 
the schism mirrors an identical disharmony between domestic traditions.  
Remarkably, both sides of the dichotomy are misguided. As a 
matter of pure doctrine, recklessness is the mental element for complicity 
most frequently applied by international criminal courts. This is evident, 
for instance, from the habitual inclusion within most international criminal 
judgments, of the refrain that “[i]f he is aware that one of a number of 
crimes will probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in fact 
committed, he has intended to facilitate the commission of that crime, and 
is guilty as an aider and an abettor.”137 Clearly, awareness of a probability 
is constitutive of culpable risk-taking, not knowledge. It goes without 
saying that the two concepts are far from synonymous. To paraphrase 
Glanville Williams, becoming an accessory by providing assistance 
“knowing that a crime is afoot” is quite different from helping “knowing 
that a crime may be afoot.”138 Could it be that the purpose/knowledge 
debate has ignored the true application of complicity in international 
criminal justice? 
Apparently so. To cite but one representative illustration,139 one 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Trial 
Chamber first reiterated the widely cited proposition that complicity 
merely requires awareness that “one of a number of crimes would 
                                                
137 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 246 (Dec. 10, 1998) 
(emphasis added); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, supra note 88, at 50; Prosecutor v. Kvocka, 
Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 255 (Nov. 2, 2001); Prosecutor v. Naletilić & 
Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 63 (March 31, 2003); Prosecutor v. 
Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment,  ¶ 350 (Jan. 31, 2005);  Other cases refer to 
accessorial liability for “foreseeable consequences” of one’s actions. See Prosecutor v. 
Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, supra note 138, at 262 (“The aider or abettor 
of persecution will . . . be held responsible for discriminatory acts committed by others 
that were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of their assistance or encouragement.”); 
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 692 (May 7, 1997) (stating that the 
aider and abettor “will . . . be responsible for all that naturally results from the 
commission of the act in question.”). 
138 Glanville Williams, Complicity, Purpose and the Draft Code - 2, CRIM. L. REV. 98, 99 
(1990). 
139 For a small selection of further examples, see Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. 
IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 759 (Feb. 22, 2001) (convicting the accused 
Kovac for handing over and/or selling two women to other soldiers whom he knew 
would “most likely continue to rape and abuse them.”); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. 
IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 602 (July 31, 2003) (convicting the accused Stakic for 
deliberately placing civilians in harms way “with the knowledge that, in all likelihood, 
the victims would come to grave harm and even death.”); Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. 
SCSL 04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 1786 (June 20, 2007) (convicting the accused Brima for 
killings because “was aware of the substantial likelihood that his presence would assist 
the commission of the crime by the perpetrators.”) . 
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probably be committed” ,140 then proceeded to convict a politician named 
Radoslav Brđanin of the war crime of willful killing for issuing a decree 
that required the victims to disarm. The key mental element linking 
Brđanin to the willful killing (of victims and by perpetrators he did not 
know in anything except broad abstractions) was that he was aware that 
the disarmament decree “could only be implemented by use of force and 
fear”. 141 But force and fear do not inevitably mean killing. Could his plan 
not be executed through beatings, torture, forced expulsion and 
intimidation instead? The only analytically plausible explanation is that 
the killings were probable but not certain. This, as we suspected, is 
recklessness. 
So international criminal justice here tolerates a type of double-
speak, claiming knowledge but applying recklessness. This disparity 
between theory and reality is surely alarming, but we should not lose sight 
of its origins. As we have seen, a range of theories hypothesize that these 
types of disparities between rhetoric and practice arise from importing 
interpretative styles typical of human rights and law of war into 
international criminal law; the effect of moral outrage on interpretative 
technique; or the broader political aspirations associated with transitional 
justice that are said to drive hermeneutics in international criminal 
adjudication.142 And yet here, the double-speak has a quite different 
genesis. Domestic criminal law in a range of countries that officially adopt 
the knowledge standard not only allows a strikingly similar application of 
the rule143; some of their leading academics openly lament that this 
“introduces reckless knowledge as sufficient.”144 The origins, therefore, 
are entirely domestic. 
Things only get worse on the conceptual level. On closer 
inspection, none of the three highly debated standards (purpose, 
                                                
140 Prosecutor v. Brđanin, supra note 114, at 272. 
141 Id. at 473. 
142 See supra note 11. 
143 LaFave, supra note 2, at 725-727 (discussing the “natural and probable consequence” 
rule in various American jurisdictions, which is very similar to that adopted in 
international criminal justice); JACQUES-HENRI ROBERT, DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRAL 350 (6e 
éd. refondue. ed. 2005) (setting out how an accomplice’s acts are unlawful if the crime 
actually committed injures the same legal interest as that the accomplice considered); 
Bohlander, supra note 2, at 167-173 (indicating that in German law, dolus eventualis will 
suffice for the accomplice’s intent); Ashworth, supra note 110, at 415-420 (discussing 
English jurisprudence that makes it adequate that the accomplice knows of the “type” of 
crime the perpetrator will commit). 
144 Ashworth, supra note 109, at 419 (cogently pointing out that “the accomplice knows 
that one or more of a group of offences is virtually certain to be committed, which means 
that in relation to the one(s) actually committed, there was knowledge only of a risk that 
it would be committed - and that amounts to recklessness.”). 
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knowledge, recklessness) is theoretically justifiable. Like other modes of 
liability in international criminal justice, all three violate the principle of 
culpability in certain circumstances because they all tolerate the 
imposition of a crime’s stigma in situations where the person convicted of 
the offense did not make the blameworthy choice necessary to be found 
guilty of that particular offense. Many point out the perversity of using 
JCE III to escalate blame for genocide in this manner, but what about 
instances where complicity has an identical effect?145 With accessorial 
liability, individuals are also held responsible for genocide where they 
knew or were merely aware that genocide was one of a number of crimes 
that would “probably be committed.”146 These scenarios, which are 
actually more common in practice, violate culpability too. Tellingly, these 
violations are explicitly based on examples drawn from a host of western 
systems.147  
Why then are all these standards conceptually problematic? Let us 
consider the reckless standard of complicity first. On a positive note, 
recklessness is at least very candid about its function—it avoids 
complicity being rendered “a dead letter”.148 The argument hinges on the 
                                                
145 Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana, Cases Nos. ICTR-96-10-A and 
ICTR-96-17-A, Judgment, ¶ 497 (Dec. 13, 2004) (“…this standard (knowledge) does not 
extinguish the specific intent requirement of genocide. To convict an accused of aiding 
and abetting genocide based on the “knowledge” standard, the Prosecution must prove 
that those who physically carried out crimes acted with the specific intent to commit 
genocide.”). 
146  The most famous use of complicity to escalate responsibility occurred in the Krstić 
case, were the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY overturned the Trial Chamber’s conviction 
of General Krstić as a principal perpetrator in genocide, substituting a conviction for the 
same crime through complicity. This was necessary, according to the Appeals Chamber, 
because “[t]here was a demonstrable failure by the Trial Chamber to supply adequate 
proof that Radislav Krstić possessed the genocidal intent.” Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. 
IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 134 (Apr. 19, 2004). There are, however, many more cases that 
adopt the same position. For a small subset of such cases across various international 
criminal tribunals, see Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, supra note 84, at 52 (finding that for the 
crime against humanity of persecution that “the aider and abettor in persecution, an 
offense with a specific intent, must be aware... of the discriminatory intent of the 
perpetrators of that crime,” but “need not share the intent”). Prosecutor v. Fofana, supra 
note 129, at 145 (“In the case of specific intent offences, the aider and abettor must have 
knowledge that the principal offender possessed the specific intent required.”); 
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgment, ¶ 2009 (Dec. 18, 2008) 
(“[i]n cases of specific intent crimes such as persecution or genocide, the aider and 
abetter must know of the principal perpetrator’s specific intent.”). 
147  See the discussion of French, German, Swiss, English, Canadian and Australian law 
within the Krstić Appeal Judgment, which ultimately carried the day in what would 
rapidly become the accepted position across all international criminal tribunals. 
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 134 (Apr. 19, 2004). 
148 BRENT FISSE & COLIN HOWARD, HOWARD’S CRIMINAL LAW 332 (5th ed. 1990). 
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inability to know the future with certainty. Even if member X of a 
criminal gang provides her terrorist colleague Y with a nuclear warhead 
for a specific terrorist mission, X cannot know with certainty that a crime 
will transpire.149 Short of knowing that water will flow downhill or that 
the sun will rise in the East, no one can know with certainty what the 
future will involve, and surely few human actions ever acquire a degree of 
predictability anywhere close to the direction of the Earth’s rotation or 
laws of physics.150  Thus, argue the recklessness advocates, we either deny 
that complicity exists for assistance in advance of the crime (because 
people can seldom know what others will do in the future) or we apply a 
standard closer to recklessness for accomplices who choose to undertake 
acts they know are inherently risky.151  
The competing criticisms of recklessness are, however, equally 
compelling. For many, embracing reckless complicity would require us to 
continuously vet those with whom we have dealings so that we can ensure 
that our interactions do not lead to potentially wide-ranging criminal 
harm. This, according to many scholars, would have the unsavory 
consequence of creating “blank cheque responsibility”,152 where the aider 
becomes responsible for all foreseeable consequences of their daily public 
interactions, transforming the average citizen into an “unpaid auxiliary 
policeman”.153 Beyond unduly infringing upon liberty and individual 
autonomy, a reckless standard of complicity would offend liberal notions 
of punishment and inhibit social intercourse.154 To return to Glanville 
                                                
149 Id. 
150 Id. Stephen Shute sees an ability to predict natural phenomena like the sun rising in 
the East as undermining the argument that "[i]n the strictest sense of the word one cannot 
'know' that something will be the case in the future.” Stephen Shute, Knowledge and 
Belief in the Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL 
PART 171, 186-187 (Stephen Shute & A. P. Simester eds., 2002); I am doubtful whether 
these examples do enough to account for Fisse’s point about knowledge. Natural 
phenomena like the sun rising tomorrow are merely examples of future events we can 
predict with the highest degree of certainty, but these illustrations do not mean that 
awareness of a probability is automatically equivalent to knowledge. To my mind, G.R. 
Sullivan offers a more accurate explanation by accepting that we can know what the laws 
of physics will produce in the future, but that many cases involving decisions about what 
defendants knew of other people’s future acts “afford graphic demonstrations of how 
statutory language is sometimes completely overridden.” G.R. Sullivan, Knowledge, 
Belief, and Culpability, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 
207, 215 (Stephen Shute & A. P. Simester eds., 2002). 
151 Fisse and Howard, supra note 148, at 332. 
152 Smith, supra note 102, at 13. 
153 Williams, supra note 134, at 101. 
154 Kadish, supra note 101, at 353 (“A pall would be cast on ordinary activity if we had to 
fear criminal liability for what others might do simply because our actions made their 
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Williams, “[t]he law of complicity makes me my brother's keeper, but not 
to the extent of requiring me to enquire whether he is engaging (or 
proposing to engage) in iniquity, when my own conduct (apart from the 
law of complicity) is innocent.” 155 
But is this always the case? Notice how neither side of this debate 
mentions desert, even though scholars of international criminal justice 
rightly hold the concept dear. To conform with desert and its analog 
culpability, recklessness should be appropriate as a standard of liability for 
the accomplice when it is adequate for the perpetrator. After all, recall that 
we earlier measured culpability by referencing elements of each particular 
crime. The argument conveniently dovetails with claims that using 
reckless as a standard for complicity where recklessness suffices for the 
crime in question would not imperil an individual’s autonomy or chill 
normal social interchange any more than reckless perpetration already 
does.156 Consequently, there is no generic difficulty to reckless complicity 
as such; it is really the application of recklessness across international 
crimes whose mental elements vary that is unduly harsh. At present, this is 
the dominant scenario in international criminal law. 
The knowledge standard for complicity is just as objectionable, 
albeit for slightly different reasons. As we have seen, a primary objection 
to the knowledge standard is that it is an epistemological impossibility for 
the vast majority of human actions,157 which probably explains why 
international criminal jurisdictions follow the many national systems that 
allow knowledge to surreptitiously dilute into recklessness. All the same, 
                                                                                                                     
acts more probable.”) As I set out in the next paragraph, Kadish does not himself agree 
with this argument. 
155 Williams, supra note 134, at 101. Apart from the responses to this line of argument I 
set out below, I also find Glanville William’s argument that recklessness “requir[es] me 
to enquire” misleading. One either assists someone believing that there is a substantial 
probability that they will use your assistance to perpetrate a crime, or one declines to 
offer that assistance. In either scenario, the duty to enquire does not enter in, and the 
metaphor of unpaid auxiliary police is unsubstantiated. The position assimilates 
complicity with omission liability perfectly, when there are important differences 
between these two types of derivative liability. See Fletcher, supra note 34, at 676-677 
(concluding a comparison between omission and complicity by highlighting the 
differences between the two, many of which undermine William’s arguments). 
156 Kadish, supra note 14, at 387 (“It is not evident to me that subjecting actors in these 
circumstances to liability for a crime of recklessness need greatly imperil the security of 
otherwise lawful activities, certainly not any more than holding actors liable for 
recklessly ‘causing’ harms, which the law regularly does. People aren’t all that 
unpredictable.”); Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of 
Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 931, 944-947 (2000) (defending reckless 
complicity against arguments of overreach).  For the traditional response to these 
arguments, see Simester, supra note 46, at 588-560. 
157 See supra note 142. 
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the knowledge standard presents another special peculiarity—knowledge 
of what? The dilemma is that the offense itself does not help answer the 
question. After all, many international crimes make no mention of 
knowledge whatsoever.158 So as soon as one utters the word knowledge, a 
whole series of deeply complicated, highly debated and ultimately 
inconsistent responses arise,159 born of “uncertainty as to whether the law 
should be concerned with [the] mental state relating to [the accomplice’s] 
own acts of assistance or encouragement, to his awareness of the 
principal’s mental state, to the fault requirements for the substantive 
offense involved, or some combination of the above.”160 Unfortunately, in 
certain contexts, this uncertainty has permeated into international criminal 
jurisdictions too.161 
 Complication, however, is not the knowledge standard’s worst 
fault. The greater concern is that knowledge also violates culpability since, 
in David and Goliath fashion, it too overpowers higher mental elements. 
As previously mentioned, knowledge usually suffices for conviction of 
international crimes requiring special intents,162 allowing the weaker 
complicity standard to eviscerate the stronger character of the crime. Like 
genocide, other international offenses from pillage to torture are said to 
demand a specific purpose, for which knowledge should be perfectly 
inadequate.163 For each of these crimes, the objective contribution to the 
                                                
158 The offense need not mention knowledge at all. For a war crime like declaring no 
quarter be given, the basic requirement is only that the perpetrator declared or ordered 
that there shall be no survivors, and that the declaration or order “was given in order to 
threaten an adversary or to conduct hostilities on the basis that there shall be no 
survivors.” These elements make no mention of knowledge, leaving a great deal of 
ambiguity about what the accomplice needs to know in order to be convicted of the 
offense. This ambiguity also leads to terrible complexity. For example, see LAW 
COMMISSION, PARTICIPATING IN CRIME, Law Com No. 305 (2007) (UK) (detailing the 
tremendous complexity of the knowledge based system within England and Wales) 
159 Weisberg, supra note 109, at 233 (exploring different interpretations of these three 
elements); Grace E Mueller, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
2169, 2174 (1987), (arguing that, because of these multiple points of inquiry, confusion 
has existed concerning the mens rea element of accomplice liability for years). 
160 LaFave, supra note 2, at 324. 
161  See the summary of inconsistent approaches, and the advent of the double intent in 
Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, ¶ 286-288 (June 30, 2006). 
162 See above, note 128. 
163 ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 76, at 26 (pillage requires that the perpetrator 
intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appropriate it for private or personal 
use,) I am compelled to add, I strongly disagree that this notion of private or personal use 
is workable or reflects customary international law. See JAMES G. STEWART, CORPORATE 
WAR CRIMES: PROSECUTING PILLAGE OF NATURAL RESOURCES 19-23 (2010).; id., at 14 
(the war crime of torture requires the perpetrator to be aware of the factual circumstances 
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crime must be carried out for a concrete purpose (to destroy, extract 
information, or for personal or private use). Therefore, by merely 
requiring knowledge as a necessary mental state for conviction, the test 
harks back to the characteristics of other international modes of liability so 
many scholars denounce as excess.  
Perhaps purpose is the solution for complicity then? Alas, the 
purpose standard only fares marginally better—it over-corrects then veers 
from the path of culpability too. True, in many of the jurisdictions that 
seemingly embrace purpose, the over-compensation is intentional. The 
drafters of the US Model Penal Code, for instance, concluded that the 
purpose standard was the preferable mental element for accessorial 
liability in order to offset the indirect nature of the accomplice’s 
contribution to the criminal harm.164 While this approach is often 
celebrated as a laudable liberal adjustment to normal principles, we should 
reflect momentarily on its implications—by this doctrine an accomplice 
who acts in such a way that she not only satisfies the mental element of 
the crime but makes an essential contribution to its realization is absolved 
of liability. And yet, if we maintain principle, this too misapplies desert 
and mis-communicates responsibility.  
For one reason, an accessory who assists a crime with intent, 
recklessness or negligence is not responsible, even though these mental 
elements are by far and away the most prevalent within the criminal law. 
Why is our faith in culpability so easily shaken here? If the mental 
element set out in the criminal offence really does define the degree of 
culpability associated with a crime (as many excellent critiques of other 
modes of liability in international criminal justice assert), then should it 
not also define the accomplice’s desert too?165 Otherwise, our method of 
                                                                                                                     
that established the protected status of the victim under the Geneva Conventions of 
1949). 
164 Evidently, the point was the subject of heated discussion. See Model Penal Code 
Commentaries (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1985), § 2.06, 318-319 (noting 
that while the Chief Reporter for the Model Penal Code favored a standard broader than 
purpose, the Institute rejected the position after tense debate). See also, Simester, supra 
note 46, at 583 (arguing that the protection of potential victims and the preservation of 
liberties for potential defendants “demand more stringent mens rea standards for 
secondary liability than is needed to establish culpability.”). 
165 I.H. Dennis, The Mental Element for Accessories, in CRIMINAL LAW: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF JC SMITH, 60 (Peter Smith ed., 1987) (criticizing the purpose standard as 
insensitive to retributive notions of desert); Sullivan, supra note 16, at 154-155 (arguing 
that in order for the accomplice to be convicted of the same offense as the perpetrator, 
retributive theory would require an equivalence of culpability.) For a competing 
perspective, see Simester, supra note 46, at 600 (arguing that “culpability is not enough... 
the better approach is to distinguish culpability from responsibility, and to focus on the 
latter.”). 
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identifying culpability is capable of manipulation based on arguments 
from policy, in ways we earlier rejected. If we adopt a more sound 
approach to culpability, then purpose is very frequently an unjustifiable 
over-compensation that, in the final analysis, leads to potentially serious 
under-punishment.  
Coincidentally, a utilitarian concept of responsibility would 
support the same conclusion. For a utilitarian view of punishment, purpose 
is unattractive since deterrence (and therefore crime prevention) is 
maximized by punishing those who are aware of even the slightest risk of 
harm.166 Admittedly here, there are more complicated questions about 
over-deterrence, which require a careful calibration of complicity 
standards with the desire for free social intercourse, especially in the realm 
of business.167 Nonetheless, utilitarian concerns tend to militate against 
adoption of the highest conceivable notion of blameworthy moral choice 
(i.e., purpose) across the entire panoply of international crimes, since 
complicity can achieve greater deterrence for such tremendous harm by 
setting the mental element at levels much closer to that defined in a crime. 
If recklessness suffices for perpetration of an offense, demanding that the 
accomplice assist the crime with the purpose of bringing it about under-
deters accomplices. 
Moreover, empirical research suggests that in many instances 
members of the public believe that the accomplice is blameworthy even 
though they did not share the perpetrator’s criminal purpose. The subjects 
of one survey reported “stark disagreement” with the “elevation thesis” 
(viz. the idea that the mental element in complicity should be elevated to 
purpose, that is, beyond that required within the paradigm of the crime 
itself).168 Instead, respondents assigned punishments to accomplices “who 
are knowing or even only reckless with respect to the criminal outcome in 
instances in which the elevation view would assign no liability.”169 We 
                                                
166 If, to paraphrase Ian Dennis, more reckless facilitators are deterred, perhaps fewer 
atrocities will transpire. Dennis, supra note 165, at 60. 
167 R A Duff, “Can I help you?” Accessorial Liability and the Intention to Assist, 10 
LEGAL STUD. 165 (1990); Glanville Williams, supra note 135, at 366–380; S Bronitt, 
“Defending Giorgianni - Part Two: New Solutions for Old Problems in Complicity” 
(1993) 17 CRIM U 305. For myself, I doubt whether business deserves the privileged 
status it often receives in the theoretical discussions of this topic, given that it merely 
represents one facet of social interaction where influence is rampant. What, for instance, 
about families, literature, music and teachers? 
168 PAUL ROBINSON & JOHN M DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME: COMMUNITY 
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 103 (1996). 
169 Id. at 103. (concluding that “[f]rom the point of view of our respondents, the 
culpability requirement as to result should not be elevated to purposeful... instead, the 
offense should be graded according to the degree of culpability that the accomplice 
shows.”). 
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might doubt the extent to which these findings could be extrapolated 
across an international community,170 but the research does at least serve 
as further grounds for caution. Using purpose as the mental element for 
complicity may badly fail to match popular notions of responsibility, 
which would diminish international criminal justice’s prospects of 
promoting reconciliation, transitional justice or other desired objectives. 
From both retributive and utilitarian perspectives then, purpose fails. 
Where does this leave us? If the preceding analysis is correct, all 
static standards of complicity are indefensible. All fixed mental elements 
for accessorial liability (i.e., purpose, knowledge or recklessness) violate 
basic principles of blame attribution since in each, there will occasionally 
be a marked departure from culpability when the elements of the crime do 
not match those of the mode of liability. In these instances, complicity 
distorts an accused’s degree of responsibility, either by amplifying 
culpability relative to the elements of the crime with which she is held 
responsible or artificially elevating culpability beyond its normal 
parameters to absolve her otherwise blameworthy conduct. In these 
situations, complicity will only conform with culpability out of chance 
couplings between mental elements within complicity and those required 
for crimes. Relative to desert, responsibility becomes arbitrary, replicating 
the very characteristics so many scholars deride in other international 
modes of liability.  
The consequences are, needless to say, hard to overstate. First, 
these departures from fundamental principles of blame attribution are not 
nefarious creations of an illiberal international system; they are borrowed 
from domestic criminal systems that set bad examples. While JCE and 
superior responsibility’s origins in domestic law are more easily concealed 
in only a portion of national jurisdictions, there can be little doubt that 
domestic criminal systems from the vast majority of the world adopt 
objectionable static mental elements for complicity. The oftentimes heated 
                                                
170  Anthony Duff argues that there is a conceptual problem with punishing at the 
supranational level, to the extent that “[c]alling someone to answer, holding someone 
responsible, is a communicative endeavor which presupposes normative community; 
normative community requires at least a modicum of mutuality” Anthony Duff, Can We 
Punish the Perpetrators of Atrocities?, in THE RELIGIOUS IN RESPONSES TO MASS 
ATROCITY 93 (Thomas Brudholm & Thomas Cushman eds., 2009).  Although these 
criticisms are important, they do tend to overlook the growing practice of national courts 
prosecuting their own nationals for international crimes within domestic courts, and the 
supranational principle of complementarity, which seeks to institutionalize that shift 
towards trials in national communities. Moreover, the enforcement of international 
criminal norms in regional international courts, which represent a more homogenous 
community, may improve the case for international criminal adjudication.  See for 
instance, William W Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law 
Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729 (2003). 
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debate between proponents of these various standards has only obfuscated 
the reality that none are theoretically defensible, and that the solution lies 
in transcending rather than deepening terms of the current debate. In this 
light, international criminal justice’s major sin is not that it has allowed 
policy interests or interpretative styles from branches of international law 
to crowd out criminal standards; but more that it has showed its domestic 
antecedents too much reverence.  
Thus, if international criminal justice is to acquire normative 
coherence, it must disassociate itself from objectionable domestic 
precedent. How would a defensible alternative look? Well, if the only 
defensible conception of accomplice liability is one where the mental 
element is the same as that required for perpetration, complicity ceases to 
retain any independent identity over and above perpetration, at least at the 
level of moral choice. And if complicity begins to dissolve into 
perpetration in this way, should modes of liability as a species not 
disappear along with it, for exactly the same reasons? In other words, if 
any static conception of a mental element within a mode of liability 
violates culpability relative to the mental elements in crimes (which vary 
from one crime to the next), should we not abolish modes of liability 
altogether in favor of a more capacious notion of perpetration? To a large 
extent, the answer to this question depends upon how complicity fares 
with respect to the second fundamental element of blame attribution. But, 
as we will soon see, the answer is no more positive.  
C. The Physical Element of Complicity 
 
 We have established not only that complicity functions as a mode 
of liability in international criminal justice, but that many international 
crimes also require harm as a pre-condition for responsibility. Given these 
characteristics, causation is conceptually necessary to bind accomplices to 
proscribed criminality if there is any chance of placating the critics of 
other international modes of liability, and more basically, of respecting the 
principle of culpability. In other words, having attributed complicity an 
ultra-orthodox status in international criminal law, we are left with a stark 
and seemingly intractable choice between only two options: we either 
accept that causation is an element of accessorial liability, in which case it 
shares common features with perpetration; or we conclude that complicity 
is acausal in structure, in which case it violates principles of culpability in 
ways that scholars of international criminal justice rightly find 
reprehensible. 
2011] THE END OF “MODES OF LIABILITY” 48 
   
 Surprisingly, international courts opt for the latter of these 
appraoches. The accepted position before international courts and 
tribunals is that “proof of a cause-effect relationship between the conduct 
of the aider and abettor and the commission of the crime, or proof that 
such conduct served as a condition precedent to the commission of the 
crime, is not required.”171 Needless to say, this defies basic thinking in 
criminal theory. By this reasoning, international courts define complicity 
in such a way that it explicitly violates a principle international criminal 
lawyers view as cardinal; a principle they often employ to passionately 
censure the breadth of other modes of liability within the field; and a 
principle that theorists call foundational.  
 Thankfully, some action relative to the criminal harm is required 
of the accomplice in international criminal law. International courts and 
tribunals invariably stipulate that “the actus reus of aiding and abetting is 
that the support of the aider and abettor has a substantial effect upon the 
perpetration of the crime.”172 But alas, this merely adds new layers of 
ambiguity to already opaque waters. What could it possibly mean to have 
a substantial effect upon the perpetration of a crime without causing it?173 
The puzzle is how courts can simply do away with causation in favor of 
this substantial effect standard, when by all accepted wisdom, “there is no 
                                                
171 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, supra note 88, at 48 (emphasis added); For a different rendering 
of the same idea, see Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 
901 (July 20, 2009) (“There is no requirement of a causal relationship between the 
conduct of the aider or abettor and the commission of the crime.”). The same standard 
has spread to other international criminal tribunals. Prosecutor v. Fofana, supra note 129, 
at 143 (same); Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, ¶ 33 
(June 7, 2001) (“the assistance given by the accomplice need not constitute an 
indispensable element, i.e. a conditio sine qua non, of the acts of the perpetrator.”). 
172 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, supra note 88, at 48; Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, Case 
No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 187 (May 9, 2007) (“the Appeals Chamber reiterated that 
one of the requirements for the actus reus of aiding and abetting is that the support of the 
aider and abettor have a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime”); 
Ndindabahizi v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-71-A, Judgment, ¶ 117 (Jan. 16, 
2007) (a conviction for aiding and abetting presupposes that the support of the aider and 
abetter has a substantial effect upon the perpetrated crime."); Prosecutor v. Brima, supra 
note 32, at 775 (“The actus reus of ‘aiding and abetting’ requires that the accused gave 
practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which had a substantial effect on 
the perpetration of a crime.”). 
173 The idea is reminiscent of a cartoon in the New Yorker magazine that depicts a 
meeting between three businesspeople, where one comments to another “we want to 
include you in this decision without letting you affect it.” See The Cartoon Bank, (2011) 
http://www.cartoonbank.com/2011/we-want-to-include-you-in-this-decision-without-
letting-you-affect-it/invt/137184/ 
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way of contributing to any result, directly or indirectly, except 
causally.”174  
 The origins of this substantial effect test are obscure in 
international criminal law,175 but we can speculate. Perhaps the position 
was tacitly influenced by English criminal theory, which has traditionally 
harbored a marked distaste for the view that an accomplice could cause 
the perpetrator’s crime. Following the seminal work of H.L.A. Hart and 
Tony Honoré on causation, the large majority of commentators within the 
English-speaking world have argued that the volitional actions required to 
convict the direct perpetrator preclude the claim that the accomplice too 
caused the harm.176 The perpetrator made a decision; this interrupts all 
earlier causal influence, and acts as an intervening cause. On this account, 
the accomplice’s actions are no more the cause of a crime than the 
perpetrator’s genes, family history and socio-economic background, all of 
which undoubtedly provide influence, without overriding the perpetrator’s 
blameworthy moral choice.177 Could this reasoning possibly explain the 
doctrinal ambiguity in the modern international criminal understanding of 
the relationships between causation and complicity? 
 It seems doubtful. While Hart and Honoré’s work has proved 
seminal, a competing line of authority has long recognized that in some 
instances, the perpetrator’s actions join rather than break causal chains 
                                                
174 Gardner, supra note 72, at 443. 
175 The International Law Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and 
Security of Mankind adopted a definition of aiding and abetting that required the 
accomplice to assist “directly and substantially”, but the only justification for this was 
that this was “intended to limit the application of the Code to those individuals who had 
had a significant role in the commission of a crime”. International Law Commission. 
Summary of the 2437th Meeting, Consideration of the Draft Articles on Second Reading, 
6 June 1996, para. 26. The two international judgments that initially endorsed the 
substantial effect standard relied on the ILC recommendation, together with a selection of 
WWII caselaw that made no direct mention of substantial effect. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, 
supra note 128, at 688-692); Prosecutor v. Furundžija, supra note 137, at 219-231. 
Accordingly, I conclude that the true criminological motivations for the substantial effect 
doctrine are mainly unarticulated. 
176 Hart and Honoré, supra note 71, at 41 (“A deliberate human act is therefore most 
often a barrier and a goal in tracing back causes in such inquiries: it is something through 
which we do not trace the cause of a later event and something to which we do trace the 
cause through intervening causes of other kinds.”); Id., at 129 (“the free, deliberate and 
informed act or omission of a human being, intended to produce the consequence which 
is in fact produced, negatives causal connection.”). 
177 Kadish, supra note 101, at 333 (arguing that otherwise, we do violence to notions of 
agency and the conception of a human action as freely chosen upon which we depend to 
convict the perpetrator). 
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created by an accomplice.178 For example, if X pays a hit-man to 
assassinate his wife, arranges for the wife to be at a specific location at a 
time he discloses to the hit-man; provides the hit-man with the weapon 
necessary for the crime and subsequently disposes of his wife’s dead 
body, there is little trouble in declaring that X caused his wife’s death.179 
Was X the actual perpetrator (in the sense of breaking the glass)? 
Obviously not; the crime was committed by the hit-man. Nevertheless, we 
are by no means precluded from simultaneously holding the hit-man 
responsible for the killing, given that we have little difficulty saying that 
both X and the hit-man caused the wife’s death.180 So if Hart and 
Honoré’s vision of perpetrators always acting as intervening causes was 
the inspiration for the international rule, the choice was poor. 
 Perhaps the motivation for abandoning causation in complicity 
stemmed from a different concern, namely that the crimes would have 
                                                
178 Moore, supra note 72, at Part IV, The Legal Presupposition of There Being 
Intervening Causes (criticizing Hart and Honore’s views that voluntary actions are 
intervening causes). Feinberg, supra note 23 (arguing, contrary to Hart and Honoré, that 
“there is no conceptual barrier, at least none imposed by common sense, to our speaking 
of the causes of voluntary actions.”); In particular, Feinberg’s conceptual distinction 
between “causing a person to act” and “making him act” offers a strong critique of Hart 
and Honoré’s thesis. Id. at 161, 165 (arguing that although a mother clearly played some 
(albeit extremely remote) causal role in her 30-year old son’s crime by merely having 
given birth to the perpetrator, it would be “misleading in the extreme” to suggest that his 
mother thirty years earlier “made” him perpetrate the crime.)  For further criticism of 
Hart and Honoré’s thesis, see Smith, supra note 87, at 68-70 (“it is possible to construct 
counter-examples where actions, while voluntary within the meaning accorded by Hart 
and Honoré, are in ‘common speech’ reasonably describable as ‘caused’ by another.”) 
For a similar position in German criminal theory, see GEORGE FREUND, in: Wolfgang 
Joecks, Klaus Miebach and Bernd von Heintschel-Heinegg (ed.), MUNCHENER 
KOMMENTAR ZUM STRAFGESETZBUCH BAND 1 1 §§ 1-51 StGB, 2003, Vor §§ 13 ff., 
marginal number 318; CLAUS ROXIN, Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil Band I: Grundlagen, 
Der Aufbau der Verbrechenslehre, 4th ed. 2006, § 11, marginal number 28, at p. 363. 
179 Moore, supra note 17, at 422-423; Christopher Kutz, Causeless Complicity, 1 CRIM. 
L. PHIL.  289, 294 (2007). In fairness to Hart and Honoré, they viewed instigation as an 
exception to their general rule that voluntary action breaks causal chains, but as Joel 
Feinberg retorts “they put forward no more general principle to explain why the 
exceptions are exceptions.” Feinberg, supra note 29, at 153. 
180 International criminal courts and tribunals confirm as much. For instance, in the media 
case where representatives of the Radio television libre des mille collines (RTLM) were 
convicting of inciting genocide, the Rwanda Tribunal held that “[t]he nature of media is 
such that causation of killing and other acts of genocide will necessarily be effected by an 
immediately proximate cause in addition to the communication itself. In the Chamber’s 
view, this does not diminish the causation to be attributed to the media, or the criminal 
accountability of those responsible for the communication.” Prosecutor v. Nahimana et 
al., supra note 76, at 952. 
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occurred whatever the accomplice did.181 In many instances, complicity is 
over-determined insofar as the accomplice’s assistance was readily 
substitutable for the assistance of someone waiting in the wings. To return 
to the Zyklon B example, if the Nazis had access to a long line of willing 
suppliers of chemical asphyxiants (or variants that had comparable 
effects), then it would be difficult to argue that the suppliers of Zyklon B 
really caused the unspeakable consequences their chemicals enabled. As 
one of the defendants claimed, had he not agreed to supply the chemicals 
to Auschwitz, “the S.S. would certainly have achieved their aims by other 
means.”182 Which judge, who knew anything about the stunning efficiency 
of the Nazi regime, could doubt the claim? So if causation means “but for” 
causation then, even if this firm did not furnish the S.S. with the means of 
exterminating humans, the horror of Auschwitz would still have unfolded 
almost identically. Thus, these particular vendors of Zyklon B did not 
really cause anything. 
 This position, however, presumes an ill-informed notion of 
causation. In the vast literature on the topic, over-determination features as 
a recurrent theme.183 Throughout this extensive treatment, over-
determined causes are consistently treated as a form of causal 
contribution, not grounds for adopting a substantial effect test in lieu of 
                                                
181 There is some support for this thesis. Both of the first cases to address complicity in 
modern international criminal justice refer to the problem of over-determination within 
the context of discussions of the substantial effect doctrine. See (Prosecutor v. Tadić, 
supra note 128, at 688 (acknowledging that “in virtually every situation, the criminal act 
most probably would have occurred in the same way had not someone acted in the role 
that the accused in fact assumed”). Prosecutor v. Furundžija, supra note 137, at 224 
(discussing a WWII case the defendant claimed that his conduct in no way contributed to 
the crimes because others would have taken his place). Nonetheless, this explanation is 
not entirely convincing, since the same judgment also acknowledged that “the culpability 
of an aider and abettor is not negated by the fact that his assistance could easily have 
been obtained from another.” Id. 
182 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 116, at 102; indeed, even if 
the S.S. were bent on using Zyklon B for the purposes, there were many other sources. 
Representatives of the firm I.G. Farben were also prosecuted for supplying large 
quantities of Zyklon-B that “was actually used in the mass extermination of inmates of 
concentration camps, including Auschwitz.” UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES 
COMMISSION, Trial of Carl Krauch and Twenty-Two Others “The I.G. Farben Trial,” 10 
LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 23-24 (1947). 
183 For an elegant philosophical discussion of the problem, which draws on examples of 
complicity, see Jonathan Glover, It Makes No Difference Whether or Not I Do It, 49 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (1975) (discussing over-determination 
with reference to a scientist producing chemical and biological weapons); Kutz, supra 
note 105 (exploring the responsibility of pilots in the Dresden fireboming on the basis of 
over-determined causes); JOHN GARDNER, OFFENCES AND DEFENCES: SELECTED ESSAYS 
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 57 (2008) (discussing over-determined causality 
in the context of complicity, although he does not use the term over-determination). 
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basic principles.184 In line with this reasoning, a slew of commentators 
from different legal traditions consider that sine qua non causation must 
be assessed relative to events “as they took place”,185 in order to avoid 
allowing defendants like these to wash their hands of responsibility. So, 
by selling vast quantities of chemical gases to the S.S. for use in 
Auschwitz, Dr. Tesch and his colleagues made an important causal 
contribution to the mass killing as it actually transpired. After all, 
ignoring how things actually transpired would mean that no one could 
ever cause murder. Everyone eventually dies, so the serial killer merely 
modifies the time, place and manner of an inevitability. Clearly, the 
modifications matter.  
 In fact, if there is a deeper unspoken influence in this perplexing 
international account of complicity, it may herald from an unlikely 
domestic source. In a surprising parallel with international principles, 
German courts apply what is described as a furtherance formula 
(“Förderungsformel”), according to which, the aider and abettor need not 
have caused but must have actually furthered (“tatsächlich gefördert”) the 
perpetrator’s crime.186 And yet, the vast majority of German academics 
strongly disagree with this approach on the predictable grounds that it 
unjustifiably discards causation.187 In fact, they are only consoled by the 
impression that the furtherance formula probably differs little in practice 
from causality, especially when causation is calculated based on “the harm 
                                                
184 Hart and Honoré, supra note 71, at 117-119 (discussing what they describe as 
additional causes, and the need for assessing sine qua non based on events that occurred 
“in this particular way”); Smith, supra note 102, at 84 (“the sine qua non condition is 
concerned with an event’s exact occurrence, including time, place, extent and type of 
harm, and so on.”); Tatjana Hörnle, Commentary to “Complicity and Causality,” 1 CRIM. 
L. PHIL. 143, 144 (2006) (using the example of a firing squad to show how the 
“subtraction method” of calculating causation leads to injustice, which might be 
overcome by focusing on events “as they happened.”);  For criticism that this approach 
misuses the term causation, see Yeager, supra note 110, at 29 (arguing that this approach 
“simultaneously uses a word [cause or causation] in a special or technical sense that need 
not confirm to our ordinary use of the word, while still trading on what we normally 
mean by it.”). Likewise, for further criticisms, see Moore, supra note 15, at 406-407. 
185 Id. 
186RGSt 58, 113 (114-115) (Entscheidungssammlung des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen 
Vol. 58, p. 113, at pp. 114-115“). See also, CLAUS ROXIN, Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil 
Band II : Besondere Erscheinungsformen der Straftat, 2003, § 26 marginal number 186, 
at p. 194. 
187 See, WOLFGANG JOECKS, in: Wolfgang Joecks, Klaus Miebach and Bernd von 
Heintschel-Heinegg (ed.), Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch. Band 1 §§ 1-51 
StGB, 2003, § 27, marginal numbers 23-37; STEPHAN A. OSNABRÜGGE, Die Beihilfe 
und ihr Erfolg. Zur objektiven Beziehung zwischen Hilfeleistung und Haupttat in § 27 
StGB, 2002, at 159-160, 261; Roxin, supra note 178. 
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in its concrete appearance.”188 The parallel is illuminating. Even if the 
influence of this German position on the international rule is unavoidably 
speculative, its incongruity with accepted theory should dampen our 
assurance that unprincipled international rules necessarily reveal the 
triumph of international agenda over the restraining force of the criminal 
law—departures from principle are ubiquitous. 
 If all this is sound, we are still left with the challenge of rescuing 
the international definition of complicity from the jaws of domestic 
incoherence. To achieve this, the standard international position requires 
inversion. If we remove the word “not” from the accepted judicial 
reasoning,189 the legal position becomes that “proof of a cause-effect 
relationship between the conduct of the aider and abettor and the 
commission of the crime is required,” and having a substantial effect on a 
crime (in the sense of making a causal contribution to events as they 
transpired) is a form of causation. This quick (but admittedly major) fix 
protects complicity against the criticisms other modes of liability have 
correctly endured within the field by ensuring that causality plays a role in 
allocating blame to the accomplice. But it still leaves one further matter 
conspicuously unexplored: why must the accomplice’s effect be 
substantial?  
 At first blush, this requirement is just as bizarre as the others. On 
the prevailing account of causation, an action is either a cause of an event 
or it is not—why the extra element? Again, the pull of mainstream 
domestic notions of complicity probably explains the doctrinal position. In 
both Anglo-American and Continental traditions, concepts of proximity or 
normative attribution intervene to preclude responsibility, where the 
causal contribution is trivial, remote or unusual.190 A member of the 
                                                
188 Joecks, supra note 188, at marginal number 27; Roxin, supra note 178. 
189 To recall, the accepted position in international criminal justice is “proof of a cause-
effect relationship between the conduct of the aider and abettor and the commission of 
the crime, or proof that such conduct served as a condition precedent to the commission 
of the crime, is not required.” See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
190 Fletcher, supra note 33, at 590 (“Because the causal link is limitless, some new 
concept must be devised to eliminate far-flung effects from the range of liability. 
Common lawyers speak about proximate cause”.); in German criminal theory, normative 
attribution (“objektive Zurechnung”) is considered an additional element of any actus 
reus, in order to restrict the broad effect of causality. CLAUS ROXIN, STRAFRECHT: 
ALLGEMEINER TEIL. GRUNDLAGEN, DER AUFBAU DER VERBRECHENSLEHRE 372 (2006); 
HEINZ KORIATH, KAUSALITÄT UND OBJEKTIVE ZURECHNUNG 15 (1 ed. 2007) (discussing 
the implications of normative attribution); MANFRED MAIWALD, KAUSALITÄT UND 
STRAFRECHT. STUDIEN ZUM VERHÄLTNIS VON NATURWISSENSCHAFT UND JURISPRUDENZ 
4-5, 9 (1980); for a helpful English language summary, see Krey, supra note 28, at 59-
101. 
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public who opens the door of a bank to let in a robber; 191 a restaurateur 
who serves a murderer dinner prior to a killing; or an onlooker who 
encourages the beating of a man who subsequently dies in an accident on 
the way to the hospital all make causal contributions to criminal harm, but 
these contributions are deemed too remote to warrant criminal 
punishment. The substantial effect doctrine precludes liability even though 
the assistance in each of these scenarios unequivocally contributed to 
crimes as they transpired.  
 Perhaps the incorporation of the substantial effect doctrine in 
international criminal law reveals the positive side of domestic influence, 
even if it is part and parcel of a dependence that sometimes has perverse 
consequences. In some instances, international criminal justice imitates 
bad domestic examples that transgress culpability; but othertimes, 
domestic influences serve commendable liberal purposes. If normative 
attribution does explain the need for a substantial effect it might fit into 
the latter category, even if the process of absorption into the international  
is not more conscious than that which produces international standards of 
blame attribution scholars rightly reject. In either case though, 
international political agenda and interpretative cultures from other 
branches of international law appear to play only back seat roles to the 
driving force of preconceptions derived from domestic criminal law.  
  In any event, once we return to the substance of complicity, our 
analysis indicates that it a defensible notion of complicity incorporates 
both causation and normative attribution (or its equivalent proximity). As 
soon as we recognize this, we are immediately drawn back into Gardner’s 
“splendid paradox”: if these elements are common to perpetrator and 
accomplice alike, why are accomplices not simply a subset of 
perpetrators?192 As Michael Moore asks, “[a]ll substantially cause the 
harm, so why is one treated as an accomplice and the others treated as 
principals?”193 To answer this, we must next investigate whether there is 
anything that necessitates a distinction between perpetrators and 
accomplices at the stage of attribution, and assuming a negative answer, 
whether complicity (like modes of liability in international criminal justice 
generally) occasions more departures from coherent philosophical 
principles, doctrinal uncertainties and hours of costly intellectual labor 
than it is worth.  
                                                
191 I borrow the example from Joshua Dressler, although he uses it in a different context. 
Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: 
New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L. J. 91, 133 (1985). 
192 Gardner, supra note 9, at 231.  Gardner views the paradox as more apparent than real 
because causal relations come in stronger and weaker versions. Id. 
193 Moore, supra note 39, at 423. 
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IV. TOWARDS A UNITARY THEORY OF PERPETRATION FOR 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
 
 Up until now, we have observed how causation and the moral 
choice contained in the definition of the crime are necessary conditions for 
allocating blame to the perpetrator and the accomplice. I now argue that 
these criteria are also sufficient. Although I do not endorse any particular 
incarnation of the unitary theory, the Austrian concept of perpetration 
offers helpful introductory flavor: “a punishable act is not simply 
committed by the person who is a direct author of it, but also by all other 
persons who cause another to execute it or who contribute in any other 
manner to its execution. Consequently, the distinction between 
perpetrators, instigators and accomplices is only of interest in order to 
permit the judge to individualize the sentence, he who plays a modest role 
being punished less than essential actors.”194 In the discussion that 
follows, I first inquire whether there is anything of a normative nature that 
theoretically precludes this approach in the abstract, then offer a range of 
pragmatic reasons why a similar approach for international crimes may be 
preferable to the status quo. 
A. An Abstract Theoretical Defense 
 International criminal justice’s response to the Hitler-as-
accomplice dilemma has played out in three overlapping phases. Initially, 
superior responsibility emerged as the theoretical response, but its 
popularity was quickly surpassed by the rise of joint criminal enterprise as 
the new prosecutorial doctrine of choice. Even though both of these modes 
of liability were drawn from Anglo-American criminal traditions then 
incorporated into the corpus of international criminal law as “sui generis” 
forms of responsibility in international law,195 they both over-extend basic 
                                                
194 Article 12, Austrian Criminal Code, translated from the French version in Pradel, 
supra note 15, at 133. It is interesting to note that according to  § 15 sec. 2 of the 
Austrian Penal Code, the attempt to facilitate an offense is not punishable. This reveals 
that the Austrian system still requires a distinction between instigators and aiders and 
cannot therefore be considered a pure unitary system. I am grateful to Thomas Weigend 
for the point. 
195 In my view, any time a court refers to a mode of attribution as “sui generis,” the latin 
acts as a mask for the departure from basic principles. The phrase is thus a telltale sign 
that the mode of liability cannot be philosophically justified. Prosecutor v. Halilović, 
supra note 52, at 78 (“The Trial Chamber further notes that the nature of command 
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principles of criminal responsibility. As this became increasingly 
apparent, these initial solutions for the problem were denounced as 
illiberal, sending decision-makers, practitioners and academics back to the 
drawing boards. Once again, they would look for domestic examples, this 
time drawing on the German doctrine used to separate perpetrators from 
accomplices as the next borrowed domestic solution. Arguably, this was 
another false step.  
 Early on in its existence, the International Criminal Court 
embraced the German “control over the crime” doctrine as a basis for 
differentiating perpetrators from accomplices.196 On this understanding, 
Hitler was a perpetrator because he had hegemonic control over the 
atrocities in concentration camps, leaving the camp guards, bureaucratic 
administrators and vendors of Zyklon B as mere accomplices. 
Domestically, this “control over the crime” theory was viewed as a major 
advance on earlier objective and subjective notions of perpetration. The 
first of these viewed a perpetrator as someone who actually swung the 
machete, but this failed to account for the fact that a perpetrator could use 
an innocent agent to carry out a crime on her behalf. The second 
subjective theory focused uniquely on whether the actor takes the crime 
“to be his own,” but this calculation cannot be easily established, and 
allows a person who perpetrates the crime with their own hand to be 
described as an accomplice.197  
                                                                                                                     
responsibility itself, as a sui generis form of liability, which is distinct from the modes of 
individual responsibility set out in Article 7(1), does not require a causal link”); 
Prosecutor v. Orić, supra note 152, at 293 (“the superior’s responsibility under 7(3) of 
the Statute can indeed be called a responsibility sui generis.”). 
196   The standard was initially adopted in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 341 (June 15, 2009);  
See also Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/07, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 486 (Sep. 30, 2008) (finding that 
the criminal responsibility of a person “must be determined under the control over the 
crime approach to distinguishing between principals and accessories.”).  The concept was 
also employed at the ICTY by one German judge, but the use of the doctrine was rejected 
on appeal. See Prosecutor v. Stakić, supra note 139, at 440; Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case 
No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, ¶ 62 (Mar. 22, 2006) (finding that “[t]his mode of liability, as 
defined and applied by the Trial Chamber, does not have support in customary 
international law or in the settled jurisprudence of this Tribunal, which is binding on the 
Trial Chambers.”). 
197 Fletcher, supra note 33, at 655 (pointing out that the subjective test was unworkable in 
practice because a trier of fact could not easily determine the attitude of the suspect at the 
time of the deed.); Schreiber, supra note 123, at 626 (detailing the criticism that the 
person swinging the machete could consider herself an accomplice, and thereby benefit 
from lower penalties afforded accessories). Ultimately, some consider that this could also 
lead to a situation where differences of opinion among assailants mean that there are no 
perpetrators of a crime at all. This would arise where all participants in a criminal offense 
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 This initial influence quickly led to a major invocation of German 
doctrine, even when certain doctrines were highly disputed domestically. 
The international experiment with “control over the crime” was soon 
followed by the adoption of German theories of co-perpetration, hitherto 
rejected in international criminal justice. Likewise, indirect perpetration 
was spawned as a viable mechanism for accounting for the Hitler-as-
accomplice dilemma, at least in certain circumstances where the 
perpetrator’s will was overcome by that of a mastermind at 
headquarters—in a command post, or behind a desk far from the 
bloodletting. To cap off the unconditional embrace of German criminal 
theory in international criminal practice, the ICC even adopted a more 
controversial German notion of functional perpetration through a 
bureaucracy,198 even though one leading German theorist feared that this 
“may create more problems than it solves.”199 
 Could the same thing be said for modes of liability in toto? Aside 
from the wider concern that these types of uncritical domestic transplants 
replicate the failed methodologies of the first two solutions to the Hitler-
as-accessory dilemma, it also conceals major philosophical assumptions. 
One is especially important. Is there is any necessary distinction between 
perpetrators and accomplices? Perplexingly, the ICC treats the question as 
axiomatic; as if it is beyond all dispute. For instance, the decision that first 
adopts the doctrine into international criminal justice simply states that 
“the definitional criterion of the concept of co-perpetration is linked to the 
distinguishing criterion between principals and accessories to a crime 
where a criminal offence is committed by a plurality of persons.”200 We 
are told nothing more about why the distinguishing criterion is so 
conceptually inevitable, perhaps revealing a blindspot in the enthusiasm 
for law crafted in a particular domestic system.  
                                                                                                                     
believed that they left the decision whether to commit the crime to others. For a full 
discussion, see Olásolo et al., supra note 17, at 30-33. 
198 See the discussion of Organisationsherrschaft (control over an organization), in 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, supra note 179, at 498-518. 
199 Thomas Weigend, Perpetration Through an Organization: The Unexpected Career of 
a German Legal Concept, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 91, 105 (2011) (“Since criminal liability 
for ordering or instigation is a sufficient basis for imposing severe sentences on 
responsible figures in the background of the actual crimes, adopting the notion of 
‘perpetration through an organization’ may create more problems than it solves.”). 
200 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 326 (June 15, 2009) (emphasis added). I add emphasis to the 
words the distinguishing criterion because the use of the singular, without further 
discussion, evidences an unquestioning allegiance to established dogma. This is precisely 
the parochial influence of the domestic that often influences international criminal 
doctrine too. 
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 In reality, the division is far from conceptually inevitable. A 
number of other jurisdictions happily dispense with it (and its attendant 
technicalities) in favor of only the two elements used to dissect 
international modes of liability like JCE and superior responsibility. What 
matters on a unitary account of perpetration it that the assailant made a 
substantial causal contribution to a prohibited harm while harboring the 
mental element necessary to make him responsible for that crime. To be 
clear, I do not consider that the unitary theory of perpetration is the only 
defensible account of perpetration or that differentiated models are 
inherently harsh. Quite the contrary, my ambition here is simply to point 
out that a unitary theory is at least as conceptually coherent as its 
counterpart. 
 To start, notice that the real question is not whether there is a 
moral difference between perpetration and complicity, but if there is such 
a difference, whether it must feature at the initial stage of determining 
liability rather than later during the sentencing phase. There is no obvious 
structural impediment to taking accessories’ generally relatively lesser 
culpability into account at the sentencing phase along with other factors 
that are important to culpability but extraneous to the label visited upon 
the accused. If a defendant’s motive for the crime, co-operation during 
trial, or history of recidivism are factors that appropriately reflect on the 
sentence they deserve, what rationale exists for treating the defendant’s 
“important criminal energy” differently?201 Certainly, it is difficult to see 
why one would choose to maintain an overly complicated, ever-expanding 
and occasionally harsh set of “modes of liability” in international criminal 
justice, if a more streamlined system can also mitigate punishment as 
necessary.   
 To a large extent, this approach answers those who view 
perpetration and complicity as inherently distinct. For John Gardner, for 
instance, there is something innately privileged about being a perpetrator 
as compared with “mere” complicity,202 such that “the attempt to 
                                                
201  I refer to “important criminal energy” because it is the classic justification for a 
distinction between perpetrators and accomplices founding German criminal theory. The 
argument is that extensive participation shows important criminal energy, and that 
qualitatively significant contributions are more culpable. So in contrast to the principal 
and instigator, whose contributions drive the wrongdoing, the aider’s contribution is of 
minor relative significance. CLAUS ROXIN, STRAFRECHT, ALLGEMEINER TEIL. BD. 2: 
BESONDERE ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN DER STRAFTAT 231 (1. A. ed. 2003);  See also 
WOLFGANG JOECKS, KLAUS MIEBACH & GÜNTHER M. SANDER, MÜNCHENER 
KOMMENTAR ZUM STRAFGESETZBUCH. GESAMTWERK: MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM 
STRAFGESETZBUCH 3. §§ 185 - 262 STGB: BD. 3 (1 ed. 2003) § 27, marginal number 1. 
202 John Gardner argues that the distinction between principals and accessories is 
embedded in the structure of rational agency. There is, in his view, a moral split between 
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eliminate complicity from the moral landscape, in favor of a more 
capacious domain of principalship, fails.”203 The distinction between 
principals and accessories, he argues, is embedded in the structure of 
rational agency—there is a moral split between what one must do 
simpliciter, and what one must do by way of contribution to what 
someone else does. While I tend to doubt the veracity of that claim,204 
observe how it does no work to maintain the segregated notion of 
complicity he defends—if there is such a distinction, it could figure at 
sentencing once the crime in question is coherently settled. Thus, the 
metaphysical distinction may well exist, but it has no obvious relevance 
for or against the unitary theory of perpetration.   
 Similarly, the derivative nature of complicity is also neutral as 
between differentiated and unitary models of perpetration.205 George 
Fletcher, for instance, insists that “[p]erpetrators or principals are those 
who are directly liable for the violation of a norm; accessories are those 
who are derivatively liable.”206 This is perfectly unobjectionable as far as 
definitions of a differentiated system go, but the definition does not 
purport to address (let alone justify) the partition of forms of attribution 
into a differentiated model. Clearly, we cannot escape our earlier analysis 
of derivative liability entirely—an individual’s responsibility for the glass 
others broke will always be at least partially derivative of at least one 
other person’s wrongdoing,207 but nothing impedes treating the 
                                                                                                                     
what one must do simpliciter, and what one must do by way of contribution to what 
someone else does. See Gardner, supra note 19, at 141. 
203 Gardner later acknowledges in response to critics that “the distinction between 
principals and accomplices might perhaps be excised from the law (e.g. for rule of law 
reasons), but… it cannot be excised from life.” Gardner, supra note 183, at 253. I am 
tempted to read this as a concession that a unitary theory of perpetration is legally 
justifiable provided moral distinctions are respected within the sentencing phase, but I no 
doubt read more into the comment than he might accept. 
204 I doubt this because the point seems entirely contingent on the construction of the 
particular offence in question. If, for example, an offence is defined as “causing rape,” 
then the criminal offence itself collapses the distinction between perpetrators and 
accomplices. Thus, if there is a distinction between perpetrators and accomplices, it is a 
byproduct of the drafting of criminal codes, not a innate property of principal 
perpetration or accessorial liability themselves. Curiously, the point is not entirely 
academic for international criminal justice—the war crime of “willfully causing great 
suffering or serious injury and cruel treatment” presumably furnishes a practical 
illustration. Conceptually, there is no difference between perpetrators and accomplices of 
this war crime, since treaty-makers have expunged any difference by employing 
causation in the crimes’ definition. 
205 For background to the derivative nature of complicity, see supra Part II.B above. 
206 Fletcher, supra note 27, at 636. 
207 For discussion of the partial derivative nature of accomplice liability, see infra section 
III.A.2. 
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considerable assistance Eichmann or others provide to direct perpetrators 
as one of very many means of perpetrating an international crime. 
Perpetrators can also be all those who contribute to a crime, whether 
directly or through another.  
 This brings us to grammatical arguments. For many, the literal 
construction of certain offenses uses terms that only a certain class of 
perpetrator can satisfy, creating a category of crimes often dubbed “non-
proxyable.”208 The classic illustrations on non-proxyable crimes include 
bigamy (which only married people can perpetrate) and being drunk and 
disorderly in a public place (which only drunk people can perpetrate), so 
the argument is that a sober or unmarried person who assists these 
offenses cannot perpetrate the crimes. If these examples seem too distant 
from international criminal justice, consider Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, the 
Rwandan Minister of Women’s Development, who was found guilty of 
rape for ordering militia under her influence to sexually violate Tutsi 
women by the thousands.209 For many proponents of the “non-proxyable” 
problem, convicting Nyiramasuhuko as a perpetrator of rape intolerably 
pretends she has a capacity she does not—if rape is defined as requiring 
the insertion of a penis into a woman’s vagina, she cannot be a 
perpetrator.  
 Yet, I am not confident that this reasoning holds any real normative 
value. This because complicity replicates the problem it is employed to 
solve—Nyiramasuhuko is found guilty of rape as an accomplice too.210 So 
if accessorial liability also fails to solve the non-proxyable problem, these 
sorts of crimes are of no value in delimiting principal from accessorial 
liability. True, re-casting complicity as the inchoate crime of criminal 
facilitation might solve the problem outright (because Nyiramasuhuko 
would not be labeled a rapist), but as I have highlighted earlier, this 
ignores the sometimes tremendous harm accomplices’ actions actually 
facilitate and discounts the fact that modern international criminal law 
unfalteringly treats complicity as a means of participating in the 
perpetrator’s crime, not as a separate inchoate offence. As such, we can 
only soothe our anxieties about the non-proxyable problem by 
understanding that it is inevitable in a system that views harm as morally 
significant.  
                                                
208 Kadish, supra note 101, at 373; Smith, supra note 102 at 107-110; Moore, supra note 
15, at 418-420; Gardner, supra note 19, at 127, 136. 
209 Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., Case No. ICTR-98-42-T, Judgment, ¶ 6087-6088 
(June 24, 2011). 
210 For proof of this in international criminal justice, see supra note 109 (showing that the 
dispositions of international courts and tribunals make no mention of complicity in over 
95% of complicity cases that lead to conviction. Instead, they merely declare the name of 
the crime with which the accomplice is convicted.) 
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 Indeed, the problem remains unresolved in ordering, instigating, 
JCE, superior responsibility, indirect perpetration, control over the act, co-
perpetration and functional perpetration; in short, all modes of liability. 
With each of these doctrine, the perpetrator need not satisfy the physical 
element in a criminal code. So why give Nyiramasuhuko’s anatomical 
status special significance over other physical elements in the definition of 
the crime? Doing so assumes an objective theory of perpetration: the 
assumption that the perpetrator is only the person who pulls the trigger, 
releases the gas, or, to borrow Eichmann’s metaphor, breaks the glass. 
And yet, the objective theory of perpetration is entirely discredited 
elsewhere,211 and the struggle for defensible solutions to the Hitler-as-
accomplice dilemma in international criminal justice is a testament to its 
inadequacy in practice.  
 This, admittedly, involves tolerating a type of fiction (here, that 
Nyiramasuhuko inserted a penis in a woman’s vagina, when she did not). 
This fiction could, of course, be quickly overcome by redefining rape (and 
other international crimes) in causal terms (i.e., as “causing rape”),212 but 
even absent this kind of major legislative exercise, “what matters morally 
is significant causal contribution, not the kinds of limitations marked by 
the causative verbs of English.”213 To absolve Nyiramasuhuko of liability 
for the mass rape she caused based on a reference to physical attributes in 
the offense that she does not possess is to prefer fidelity to verbal 
semantics over substantive coherence. Like others, I believe that 
“normative rather than linguistic considerations would seem the more 
persuasive.”214 The overarching point, however, is that whatever real 
problems non-proxyable crimes present are equally true of unitary and 
differentiated models of perpetration alike, depriving this line of reasoning 
of any analytical purchase in debates between the two models. 
 Another frequent argument is that the unitary theory of 
perpetration violates the principle of legality by conferring judges with 
undue discretion in sentencing? For many, if statutory offences were 
meant to include even remote causal contributions, the legislature would 
                                                
211 Fletcher, supra note 33, at 654-656 (highlighting reasons for the departure from the 
objective theory of perpetration); Hans-Ludwig Schreiber, supra note 123, at 614 
(placing the objective theory of perpetration in historical context, and demonstrating the 
passage to a subjective theory, then the turn to “control over the act.”); Dubber, supra 
note 7, at 983 (highlighting how the position in the US Model Penal Code resembles the 
objective theory, perhaps explaining why the non-proxyable problem remains so vital in 
English language theory). 
212 As mentioned earlier, the war crime of “willfully causing great suffering” already 
takes this form. See supra note 202. 
213 Moore, supra note 15, at 417. 
214 Kutz, supra note 105, at 303. 
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have to enact even greater sentencing ranges below usual minimums, 
conferring judges with extreme discretion in sentencing.215 This renders 
law insufficiently certain. Worse, the breadth of this discretion would be 
all the more worrisome as judges would still have to make the types of 
intricate differentiations that are presently undertaken at the attribution 
level (i.e., distinguishing between aiding, co-perpetration, indirect 
perpetration, instigation, etc.) when calculating sentences, only these 
determinations would take place without conceptual guidelines and behind 
closed doors.216 Consequently, a unitary system just brushes the problems 
under the carpet.  
 But these arguments are also unpersuasive. Although the point is 
obscured by the ICC’s assumption of the differentiated model, the truth is 
that in the many differentiated jurisdictions, judges reason inductively to 
force facts into legal categories they feel allow for an appropriate 
punishment.217 Instigation is elevated to indirect perpetration; aiding is 
recast as co-perpetration. To illustrate, certain courts describe a case of 
acting as a lookout for a criminal perpetrator—everywhere the textbook 
example of aiding—as co-perpetration in order to allow for the full scope 
of punishment afforded a perpetrator.218 In fact, this trend is so dominant 
in practice that “[i]t seems that no longer the dogmatic categorization 
determines the severity of the sentence imposed, but conversely that the 
severity of the sentence deemed desirable determines the categorization of 
the conduct in question.”219 If this is true, fears of judicial discretion are 
                                                
215 CLAUS ROXIN, in: Burkhard Jähnke/Heinreich W. Laufhütte/Walter Odersky (ed.), 
Strafgesetzbuch. Leipziger Kommentar :Erster Band, 11th ed. 2003, Vor § 25, marginal 
number 6. See also, HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK and THOMAS WEIGEND, Lehrbuch des 
Strafrechts. Allgemeiner Teil, 5th ed. 1996, 646. 
216 Id., marginal number 8. 
217 THOMAS ROTSCH, “EINHEITSTÄTERSCHAFT” STATT TATHERRSCHAFT: ZUR ABKEHR 
VON EINEM DIFFERENZIERENDEN BETEILIGUNGSFORMENSYSTEM IN EINER NORMATIV-
FUNKTIONALEN STRAFTATLEHRE 462 (1. Auflage. ed. 2009) (showing how 
considerations of culpability and sentencing prompt practitioners and theorists to choose 
somewhat arbitrarily between modes of attribution to apply.) Evidently, these practices 
have a long history. Schrieber explains that during the Weimar Republic reform efforts 
were undertaken to relax strict insistence on the derivative nature of complicity so as “to 
constrain the scope of indirect perpetration and to relegate many of the cases that were 
thus being dealt with as a species of perpetration back to the category of complicity.” 
Hans-Ludwig Schreiber, supra note 123, at 620. This is also true in France, where the 
fact that complicity does not attach to the lowest form of crimes (called “contraventions”) 
leads the French Cour de Cassation to declare accomplices co-perpetrators to avoid their 
acquittal. For details, see BERNARD BOULOC, GASTON STEFANI & GEORGES LEVASSEUR, 
DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRAL 287-288 (19e édition ed. 2005). For further modern examples 
from the Netherlands and elsewhere, see Johannes Keiler, supra note 18, at 186-190. 
218 HR 23 oktober 1990, NJ 1991, 328, cited in Keiler, supra note 18, at 187. 
219 Keiler, supra note 18, at 190. 
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unavoidable for both theories, meaning that the argument from legal 
certainty does not lead inexorably to a differentiated system of 
perpetration.  
 Finally, arguments about the expressive capacity of a differentiated 
model do not appear to furnish it with great legitimacy. Under a 
differentiated scheme, a defendant’s responsibility is expressed through 
the combination of at least two essential components: (a) the mode of 
participation; and (b) the name of the crime with which she is convicted. 
To eliminate (a) returns us to the problem of fair labeling principle—the 
criticism is that grouping the people who shot helpless refugees with AK-
47s and the businessman who supplied the weapons under a single banner 
of say murder unfairly groups disparate degrees of responsibility, which a 
fair system of representation ought to segregate by employing additional 
qualifiers.220 This observation leads into often implicit normative 
differences between perpetration and participation,221 and provides the 
impetus for the invention of notions like functional perpetration, that 
allow the doctrinal label to encapsulate an element of the collectivity 
through which the crime came about.222 
 There are, in my view, at least four problems with this account, 
each of which shows how a unitary theory is arguably more capable of 
fine-tuned expression than its counterpart. First, and least importantly, the 
argument for the expressive capabilities of a differentiated model ignores 
that international courts and tribunals do not mention the mode of liability 
within the disposition of their judgments in more that 95% percent of 
cases surveyed.223 As we have seen, in the vast majority of instances, 
dispositions contained in international judgments merely list element (b), 
                                                
220 See infra section II.A; Frédéric Mégret also elevates fair labeling to a principle of 
fairness in human rights. See Frédéric Mégret, Prospects for "Constitutional" Human 
Rights Scrutiny of Substantive International Criminal Law by The ICC With Special 
Emphasis on the General Part,  http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/Evaluating_FM.pdf 
221 van Sliedregt, supra note 59 (arguing that whether members of a JCE must comply 
with the full mens rea of genocide turns on whether they are perpetrators or participants); 
Cassese, supra note 25, at 26 (arguing that it is a logical impossibility for someone who 
does not have the necessary mens rea for genocide to “commit” the crime, but accepting 
that he or she may aid and abet the crime nonetheless). I am grateful to Thomas Weigend 
for confirming that the fact that JCE and Superior Responsibility purport to act as forms 
of “committing” a crime whereas complicity is a mere means of participation is the 
normative basis upon which the two concepts might diverge within a differentiated 
model. 
222 For one of the most thoughtful discussions, see Harmen van der Wilt, Joint Criminal 
Enterprise and Functional Perpetration, in SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (Andre Nollkaemper & Harmen van der Wilt eds., 2009) 
223 See supra note 104. 
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the crime with which an accused is convicted.224 That there is almost 
never mention of element (a) viz. the mode of liability within dispositions 
tends to suggest an unfortunate mismatch between abstract theorizing and 
practice—international criminal justice does not presently offer a vehicle 
for the expressive capacity the differentiated model demands.  
 Other difficulties are more difficult to overcome. Take, for 
instance, the miscommunication of responsibility inherent in labeling an 
accomplice a genocidaire when she does not have the requisite special 
intent. Some justify this disparity by pointing to a normative divide 
between “committing” a crime and other forms of “participation,”225 
although the rationale for the division invariably goes unannounced. In 
purely analytical terms though, one struggles to see a justification for the 
division when commission and participation both make an accused 
responsible for one and the same crime. As a matter of logic, the 
amalgamation of misaligned modes of liability and elements of crimes 
must corrupt one or both concepts, and branding an accomplice with a 
label he does not deserve still misrepresents responsibility, even if you 
have diminished the time she will serve in prison.  
 A differentiated model uses legal terms to express graduated 
degrees of blame, but there is also a danger that labels for modes of 
liability need not carry any great meaning for relevant audiences, further 
undermining the differentiated model’s expressive capacity. Arguably, 
describing someone as an “instigator” of genocide means something 
comprehensible to lay stakeholders in certain jurisdictions, but I have 
grave doubts whether murder through a combination of indirect and co-
perpetration holds any comparable significance. The risk is that the 
meaning of increasingly abstract legal terms used to describe modes of 
liability seems esoteric to ordinary citizens, who no longer understand the 
terminology or its moral implications.226 If this is true, a lack of 
comprehension among the public adds another layer of distortion to the 
condemnatory aspirations of international trials.  
 Contrary to usual expectations, the unitary theory may offer 
greater expressive capacity here. Under the unitary model, an accused 
could be convicted of genocide, denoting that she made a substantial 
contribution to the destruction of an ethnic group with the requisite 
intention to bring the crime about, then a judgment could append a single 
concise plain language explanation of her contribution i.e. GUILTY of 
genocide for supplying machetes to the Interahamwe. Structurally, one 
would immediately know that this conduct led to the crime described and 
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that the defendant adopted a subjective disposition necessary to constitute 
genocide—she really wanted the Tutsi exterminated. The differentiated 
alternative (i.e. GUILTY of (a) aiding and abetting (b) genocide) does not 
tell us nearly as much about the culpability of the accused, because the 
formalistic concept “aiding and abetting” varies so widely from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and, just as importantly, may spoil the identity 
of the crime.  
 This leads to a final related observation. To date, much of the 
debate around modes of liability in international criminal justice seems to 
have presumed that the crime and the mode of liability must do all the 
expressive work. But what prevents the judgment itself shouldering some 
of this load? For example, functional perpetration is necessary, we are 
told, to symbolically denounce the collective apparatus that enabled the 
individual crime.227 And yet this begs the question why a court could not 
simply state whatever collective structures enabled the offence as part of 
its narrative. Without addressing this question, these often very insightful 
analyses of how traditional notions of perpetration do not adequately 
capture the reality of collective action that are so frequently part and 
parcel of atrocity risk overburdening “modes of liability,” when a plain 
language explanation within a judgment may suffice. 
  
B. The Specificities of International Crimes 
 
 If a unitary theory of perpetration is not theoretically foreclosed, 
we must inquire which of the two models is preferable for the 
particularities of international crimes. From the very beginning, the fact 
that an international system of blame attribution does not already exist is 
surely anomalous—for all the international interest in ending impunity, 
transitional justice and modes of liability, there is no treaty regime that 
defines modes of participation international crimes. With war crimes for 
instance, the Geneva Conventions themselves furnish “only keywords to 
designate a criminal act, nothing which can be called a definition”,228 
leaving a range of indispensable criminal concepts “under a cloud of 
                                                
227  See van der Wilt, supra note 222. Harmen van der Wilt also argues that we should 
not underestimate the symbolic expressive value of JCE. While I agree with everything 
in this excellent article, I merely disagree with the final step where they seek to rely on a 
differentiated model of perpetration for expression. 
228 Michael Bothe, War Crimes, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT, 392 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, & John R. W. D. Jones eds., 
2002). 
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obscurity.”229 This is most certainly true of modes of participating in these 
crimes—while the Conventions require states to implement legislation 
allowing for the prosecution of those responsible for “committing or 
ordering to be committed”,230 they deliberately stopped short of 
elaborating on the extent of these concepts.231 Whatever might be said 
about the merit of this approach as a means of securing broad participation 
in the treaty regime, it has proved to be a thorn in the side of practitioners 
ever since. 
 Despite popular views to the contrary, the ICC Statute does not 
markedly change this situation. For one reason, some of the world’s 
leading countries are not party to the ICC Statute, meaning that recourse 
to customary international law remains inevitable in many instances where 
international crimes might be enforced. As a reflection of this, the ICC 
Statute formally safeguards the continued co-existence of customary 
international law outside the treaty regime,232 allowing for a complex 
mosaic of blame standards that stem from all range of international legal 
sources to simultaneously co-habitat the discipline. Even states that have 
signed and ratified the Rome Treaty are not required to emulate modes of 
attribution as defined in the ICC statute within their domestic legal orders. 
As a consequence, international modes of liability are extremely difficult 
to identify. 
 The first problem with the scheme is methodological. While the 
ICC Statute brings a degree of clarity to cases arising within its four walls, 
many international trials still depend on custom as a source of law. The 
difficulty is, as Martii Koskiennemi famously argued, that custom is quite 
“useless” at generating definitive standards.233 So even in a field like 
                                                
229 G.I.A.D Draper, The Modern Pattern of War Criminality, in WAR CRIMES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 160 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1996). 
230 See, for example, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, Art. 146 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S 287/1958 A.T.S No 21  (“The High 
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breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article.”). 
231 This is evident, for instance, from the statement of one negotiator at the time who 
observed that “‘[t]he Conference is not making international penal law”. Final Record of 
the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. II, Section B, at 116. 
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purposes other than this Statute.” 
233 Martti Koskenniemi, The Pull of the Mainstream, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1946, 1952 
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international human rights, where legal precision is comparatively less 
important, some of the leading exponents observe that “the human rights 
movement’s quest for additional sources finds its favorite candidate, 
customary international law, in the midst of a profound identity crisis.”234 
Despite this crisis, a differentiated system of blame attribution in 
international criminal justice depends on the very same candidate for 
defining the terms of serious criminal responsibility. 
 This leads to major practical difficulties. For instance, despite the 
prolific use of JCE III over the past debate, the Extraordinary Chambers in 
Cambodia recently disagreed with the original Tadić decision that had 
declared JCE III part of customary international law.235 Whatever might 
be said about the relative strengths of either court’s reasoning, the content 
of customary modes of attribution is clearly unacceptably uncertain if 
different judicial bodies can reach diametrically opposed conclusions 
based on similar materials. While it is arguably not the business of 
international criminal justice to overcome the latent deficiencies with 
customary international law writ large, the absence of any restriction on 
the number of “modes of liability” enables types of scenario to continue 
unchecked. Put differently, a unitary theory of perpetration precludes the 
uncertainties of custom infiltrating the criminal process.  
 The wider concern is that such an ill-defined set of differentiated 
“modes of liability” violate the principle of legality. As we well know, the 
principle of legality has a rich but troubled history in international 
criminal law, from its identification as a merely principle of justice at 
Nuremberg to more definite modern accounts that sometimes do not 
restrain any better.236 When the methodology for identifying customary 
standards is so vague, and there is no numerical cap on how many modes 
                                                                                                                     
should be prohibited that is driving the analysis of custom, not some objectively 
ascertainable standard that might be obtained in a dispassionate positivist fashion. 
234 Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus 
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AYIL 82, 88 (1988); The attempts to justify concepts 
in human rights (and international criminal law) into the corpus of customary 
international law even though they are not easily reconciled with normal standards for 
identifying custom is, I suspect, an example of what David Kennedy calls “a combination 
of overly formal reliance on textual articulations that are anything but clear or binding 
and sloppy humanitarian argument.” See David Kennedy, International Human Rights 
Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 120 (2002). 
235 Prosecutor v Ieng et al, Case No: 002-19-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38), para. 83 “For 
the foregoing reasons, the Pre-Trial Chamber does not find that the authorities relied 
upon in Tadic…constitute a sufficiently firm basis to conclude that JCEIII formed part of 
customary international law at the time relevant to Case 002.” 
236 For an excellent overview of this history together with modern manifestations of the 
problem, see Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the 
Intersection of Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119 (2008). 
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of liability might be “discovered” in customary international law, the 
danger is that international blame attribution seriously threatens 
legality.237 As Beth Van Schaack points out, most common law 
jurisdictions prohibited the notion of common law crimes in the 19th 
century, precisely because the combination of judge-made law and serious 
criminal liability was perceived as compromising legality and its liberal 
underpinnings.238 And yet modern international criminal justice not only 
permits the historical anachronism, it also places no limit on the quantity 
of modes of liability the methodology can generate.  
 This leads to a further set of problems. Even where the principle of 
legality is honored, international standards of blame attribution remain 
seriously fragmented. Complicity itself is an illustration. If we accept the 
differentiated system incorporated in the ICC together with the German 
mechanisms for dividing perpetrators and accomplices, we are still left 
with a mental standard for complicity in the ICC that is markedly higher 
than the equivalent in the vast majority of crimes within that court’s 
jurisdiction, with standards before other international courts that claim 
knowledge but contract to recklessness in practice (thus violating 
culpability in certain circumstances), and with all range of domestic 
variants of complicity across the spectrum of national courts capable of 
trying international crimes. If we are serious about international 
expressive accounts of international justice,239 a real danger is that the 
meaning of international condemnation is lost in translation. 
 This draws us back into earlier discussion about the superior 
expressive capabilities of a unitary theory. In our previous theoretical 
discussion, we observed how a unitary theory allows a principled 
determination of criminal responsibility, then flexible opportunities to 
describe the nature of the contribution without legalese. I the expressive 
value of modes of are not fully comprehended within the national 
jurisdictions where they originated, they are likely to export very poorly to 
foreign cultures as part of the international adjudicatory process, given 
that victims, perpetrators and members of their communities are even less 
familiar with the significance of terms like “instigation,” “joint criminal 
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enterprise” or “indirect perpetration.”240 In the words of Immi Tallgren, 
the disapproval communicated by international criminal justice “risks 
being unclear or having adverse connotations, depending on the 
background of the offender.” The same is true for victims and local 
communities. 
 Aside from concerns about the quality of the responsibility 
expressed, there are also the absence of substantive restraints on the scope 
of international modes of liability—the open-ended system of 
differentiated “modes of liability” does little to ensure that the standards 
courts apply accord with any conceptual foundations. This, as we have 
seen, is an acute problem when international courts draw so heavily on 
national doctrine that may or may not accord with basic principles in 
blame attribution, and when universal jurisdiction allows all range of 
courts to hear these cases. The open ended nature of modes of liability acts 
as an invitation for practitioners socialized in different systems to 
prioritize their own domestic schooling in criminal law, since that is what 
most senior practitioners bring to international prosecution. The 
differentiated system does not tell us which of the myriad variants 
international courts should adopt nor place conceptual restrictions on 
modes of liability of the type outlined here. In the face of this reality, a 
unitary theory of perpetration might better preserve (and advertise) 
culpability as the benchmark for international criminal responsibility, 
ending the various phases of international courts mimicking of domestic 
practice and shifting academic debates to issues of sentencing, where 
these discussions belong. 
 Equally importantly, the unitary theory would simplify a body of 
rules governing international modes of liability that has attained a degree 
of technicality that is in jeopardy of alienating those who matter most. 
From experience, very few practitioners of international criminal justice 
understand the full import of “modes of liability,” which they tend to 
allocate to experts trained in relevant national jurisdictions wherever 
possible. This tendency is exacerbated when leading texts describing 
prominent international modes of liability are not available in official 
United Nations languages, further reinforcing the professional dependence 
on experts socialized in only a small number of jurisdictions. It goes 
without saying that these issues are likely to inhibit the engaged 
participation of victims, perpetrators and affected communities, who are 
generally even less equipped to deal with technocratic jargon than the 
professionals who represent them. It would probably be easier to endure 
these struggles if they were conceptually unavoidable, but of course, they 
are not. 
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 A unitary theory might also mediate the dissonance between 
national and international concepts of blame attribution more 
meaningfully. At present, standards of blame attribution vary wildly from 
one jurisdiction to the next, producing a fragmented array of rules. 
Predictably, the dissimilarity in international versus domestic standards 
has and will continue to cause major practical problems. In one case tried 
within the Netherlands, for instance, a Dutch court invested considerable 
energy into determining whether it was required to apply international or 
domestic notions of complicity when prosecuting its own national for 
genocide.241 From the reasoning in the decision, the question appeared 
determinative of the defendant’s responsibility for a crime no less than 
genocide—application of the national standard of complicity led to 
conviction; the international equivalent did not. Without common 
standards of blame attribution, serious criminal responsibility presently 
turns on largely arbitrary elections between two competing notions of 
blame attribution.  
 The system that is also highly inefficient. As is well known, the 
two ad hoc UN international tribunals alone are estimated to have claimed 
roughly 15 percent of the United Nations annual budget, which a projected 
cost of around $25 million per case.242 While it is nigh on impossible to 
quantify the portion of that figure attributable to the unsettled pluralistic 
nature of international modes of liability, there can be little doubt that 
radically limiting litigation over these concepts would free up 
considerable capacity, save donors resources and hasten trials.243 Just a 
short glance at the number of appellate cases that involve complex (but 
conceptually unnecessary) questions about modes of liability confirm as 
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much. A more efficient system promotes rights to expeditious trial that are 
frequently in jeopardy internationally, and makes capital available that 
might minimize the selectivity of trials. As such, a more streamlined 
concept of perpetration promotes accountability.  
 Finally, to return to one of the central themes of this paper, a 
unified theory of perpetration is important from a purely functional 
perspective. Throughout, much of the debate about “modes of liability” 
has assumed a false duality between mastermind and physical perpetrator. 
In reality, there are also accomplices who make important (sometimes 
indispensible) contributions to the ways atrocities unfold. I have in mind 
corporations—the suppliers of weapons, the banks who finance military 
offensives, representatives of extractive industries who bankroll 
warlords—all play surprisingly important roles in sustaining modern 
bloodshed. Although these sorts of inputs have received little more than 
hortatory acknowledgement in modern international criminal justice, as 
soon as this veil is lifted, we will see that unified standards of blame 
attribution are essential to creating a level playing field capable of treating 
accomplices equally.  
 Without this, the system of international criminal law enables safe-
havens, corporate races to the regulatory bottom to avoid liability, and 
perceptions that businesses in certain jurisdictions are at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis those elsewhere. In other areas, international law 
has some great experience in erecting universal standards in order to deal 
with these global realities—in treaties ranging from the Warsaw 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International 
Carriage by Air to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, states have rationalized a single set of 
standards to address transnational practices. So while I am sensitive to the 
compelling arguments for pluralism in international criminal justice,244 I 
can only assume that in international criminal justice too, the need to 
avoid overt injustice trumps the otherwise understandable desire for 
doctrinal heterogeneity between legal systems. 
 How then would this uniformity be achieved? A unitary theory of 
perpetration for international crimes cannot simply replace all standards of 
attribution everywhere—the prospect of revolutionizing global standards 
of attribution is politically unthinkable and culturally undesirable. 
Nonetheless, national courts prosecuting international crimes could use an 
international unitary standard of perpetration in domestic cases involving 
international crimes, leaving habitual modes of attribution to continue 
unaffected for everyday domestic crimes. As a matter of ironic 
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coincidence, this would emulate an extant scheme in German law, which 
applies a unitary theory of perpetration to a specific subset of 
administrative offences, even though it maintains its famous differentiated 
model for other crimes.245 The only difference would be that this model 
would displace and annul customary international standards then apply 








 In a recent article questioning the merit of a continued distinction 
between perpetration and complicity, one eminent expert in criminal 
theory asks, “how can there be such frequent disparities of responsibility 
and culpability between perpetrators and accomplices when both are 
equally guilty of the crime in question?”246 The answer to the question in 
domestic criminal law lies in fragmented growth of criminal law in stages 
though different epochs, leaving a unified body of rules that need not 
coincide with rational principles.247 In international criminal law, 
however, the answer lies in the fact that international courts have 
borrowed historically contingent doctrine from these domestic systems, 
even when they defy accepted principles international courts themselves 
nobly endorse as a matter of course. Modes of liability, and complicity in 
particular, typify this trend. 
 Ever since the modern revival of the international criminal project, 
“modes of liability” have arguably featured as the most debated topic. In 
response to an acute unease with treating Hitler as an accessory, 
international criminal courts and tribunals have adopted controversial 
domestic models that resolve the problem, but scholars have more recently 
exposed the objectionable nature of aspects of these doctrines, forcing 
international courts into a third phase characterized by a sweeping 
receptivity to German distinctions between perpetrators and accomplices. 
In each of these phases, we scholars have only focused on a limited set of 
                                                
245 Bohlander, supra note 2, at 153 (discussing the use of of unitary theory of perpetration 
(Einheitstaterbegriff) for administrative offences (Ordnungswidrigkeiten). For further 
information about administrative offences, see Krey, supra note 34, at 21. 
246 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 156. 
247 ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON, AND HISTORY : A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO 
CRIMINAL LAW 8-9 (1993). 
2011] THE END OF “MODES OF LIABILITY” 73 
   
modes of liability, without considering the broader implications for 
international blame attribution writ large. Simultaneously, international 
influence, both legal and political, has emerged as the dominant 
explanation for the various departures from basic principles in blame 
attribution. 
 Complicity, however, also fails many of the standard tests 
employed to criticize modes of liability in international criminal justice, 
and in all likelihood, modes of liability as a species will suffer the same 
fate. As I suggest throughout, this troubling reality stems less from 
international influence and more from the natural infiltration of 
indefensible domestic doctrine into the international arena. Thus, while 
the common criticism is that international modes of liability have lost 
touch with “the restraining force of the criminal law tradition,”248 this 
perspective overlooks the domestic criminal law’s long history of internal 
inconsistency and the great influence of domestic principles 
internationally. So if experts sadly observe “a gap between liberal rhetoric 
(general principles) and practical reality (pervasive exception) within 
national criminal systems,”249 we should be unsurprised to find that it 
resurfaces internationally.  
 This said, there may be scope for reversing this trend. In his 
seminal work on the grammar of criminal law, George Fletcher posits that 
international law, and international criminal law in particular, can come to 
play a vital role in the development of defensible domestic doctrine. He 
argues that “the task of theorists in the current century is to elaborate the 
general principles of criminal law that should be recognized not only in 
the International Criminal Court, but in all civilized nations.”250 If this 
framing is correct, a unitary theory of perpetration for international crimes 
could overcome the sometimes major shortcomings of modes of liability 
in international criminal law and act as a constructive influence on 
domestic practices. Until then, domestic criminal law will remain a vital 
and predominantly welcome point of reference for international courts and 
tribunals, but a mature international system also recognizes the darkness it 
stands to inherit from its domestic predecessors and opts for a different 
path. 
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